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INTRODUCTION 
Across a constitutional divide, Congress and the 
federal courts share a mutual obligation to ensure that 
our judicial system offers all Americans justice in civil 
and criminal matters within a reasonable time and at 
reasonable expense.  Neither branch alone can 
accomplish this important goal.  The federal judiciary 
cannot adequately solve systemic problems affecting 
congestion, delay, and costs in the courts without 
appropriate legislative reform instituted by 
Congress.  Congress, for its part, cannot legislate 
efficiency in the federal court system without granting 
federal judges the autonomy, resources, and direction 




Such were then-Senator Joseph Biden's words describing the need 
to empower federal judges in 1994 after the passage of the Civil 
Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA).2 
                                                 
*
 Jeffrey Scott Wolfe serves as a United States Administrative Law Judge with 
the Social Security Administration Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, 
previously serving as United States Magistrate Judge, U.S. District Court, Northern 
District Oklahoma.  He is a graduate of the University of California, San Diego 
(A.B., 1973), California Western School of Law (J.D., 1976), and the University of 
San Diego School of Law (LL.M., cum laude, 1991).  He teaches as an adjunct 
professor of law at the University of Tulsa College of Law, where he currently 
teaches Social Security Disability Law and Arbitration Law.  He also serves as one 
of two coaches for the University of Tulsa College of Law National Health Law 
competition team.  He is a member of the California and Oklahoma Bar 
Associations. 
The views, ideas, and opinions expressed herein are solely those of the Author 
and not the United States Government, the Social Security Administration, or any 
component thereof.  This Article does not reflect the views, policies, or opinions of 
the United States Government, the Social Security Administration, or any 
component thereof. 
 
1 Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Congress and the Courts: Our Mutual Obligation, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 1285, 1285 (1994). 
2 28 U.S.C. §§471-482 (2006). 
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The CJRA became the cornerstone of federal judicial reform, 
designed to combat growing costs and delay in the federal courts--
circumstances that held potential for increasingly reduced access to 
the courts by the American public.3 These words and the actions they 
describe are equally true today when considering the Social Security 
Administration's (SSA's) system of administrative appeals, described 
as the largest administrative adjudicatory system on the planet.4 
Some 700,000 administrative appeals are now pending before 
SSA in a system designed to handle only 400,000.  This “backlog” of 
some 300,000 appeals is not a single-year phenomenon, but has been 
growing for decades. The salient truths emerging from this backlog 
are not interesting tidbits for statisticians but stories of human 
suffering as American citizens wait--in some cases, for more than 
two years--for their “day in court” after being denied disability 
benefits. 
The hard truth behind this story is that it could have been 
avoided.  In a report released in December 2007, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) stated: 
 
[M]anagement weaknesses as evidenced by a 
number of initiatives that were not successfully 
implemented have limited SSA's ability to remedy the 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Extending the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 64 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 105 (1995). The author notes: 
 
The Act commanded that by December 31, 1995 the Judicial 
Conference submit a report on the pilot program, including an 
analysis of how much the principles and guidelines decreased 
expense and delay, to the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and 
of the House of Representatives.  The legislation required that the 
Conference consider these results in light of the effect on cost 
and delay.... 
 
Id. at 107 (footnote omitted). 
4 See Information About Social Security's Hearings and Appeals Process, Soc. 
Sec. Online, http://www.ssa.gov/appeals (last modified Jan. 20, 2012) (“The Social 
Security Administration's (SSA) administrative appeals operation, under the Office 
of Disability Adjudication and Review (ODAR) is one of the largest administrative 
judicial systems in the world. SSA issues more than half a million hearing and 
appeal dispositions each year. Administrative law judges (ALJ) conduct hearings 
and issue decisions.”). 
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backlog.  Several initiatives introduced by SSA in the 
last 10 years to improve processing times and 
eliminate backlogged claims have, because of their 
complexity and poor execution, actually added to the 
problem.  For example, the “Hearings Process 
Improvement” initiative implemented in fiscal year 
2000 significantly increased the days it took to 
adjudicate a hearings claim and exacerbated the 
backlog after the agency had substantially reduced it.5 
 
Most recently, the agency has sought and attained appointment of 
an increased number of administrative law judges (ALJs)—judges 
appointed under the aegis of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA)6—to hear and decide cases in an increased number of hearing 
offices around the country. As SSA Commissioner Michael J. Astrue 
has commented, “increasing the number of administrative law judges 
has resulted in a plateau in the rise of pending cases.”7 While 
laudable, the issue framed by the backlog centers not simply on the 
number of judges but on the way in which they work--especially 
within the bureaucratic milieu of an executive branch agency such as 
SSA. 
The world's largest administrative judicial system houses some 
1,300 federal administrative law judges within the Office of 
Disability Adjudication and Review (ODAR).  These judges are not, 
                                                 
5 U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-08-40, Social Security Disability: 
Better Planning, Management, and Evaluation Could Help Address Backlogs 3-4 
(2007) [hereinafter GAO-08-40, Better Planning], http:// 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d0840.pdf. 
6 See 5 U.S.C. §3105 (2006), which provides: 
 
Each agency shall appoint as many administrative law judges 
as are necessary for proceedings required to be conducted in 
accordance with sections 556 and 557 of this 
title.  Administrative law judges shall be assigned to cases in 
rotation so far as practicable, and may not perform duties 
inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities as 
administrative law judges. 
 
7 News Release, Soc. Sec. Admin., Social Security Hearings Backlog Falls to 
Lowest Level Since 2005 (Mar. 2, 2010), http:// 
www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/pr/hearings-backlog-0310-pr-alt.pdf. 
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however, “independent” as are members of the federal judiciary. 
Instead, embedded within an executive branch agency, the federal 
administrative judiciary within ODAR is described as “quasi-
independent,” functioning this way as a result of the APA, which 
provides for independent decisionmaking and quasi-independence in 
tenure and service. 
Given the foregoing, the premise underlying this Article and each 
of its several sections is straightforward: the task of judging embraces 
discrete skills that cannot be fully maximized absent a jurisprudential 
environment in which such skills may be fully exercised.  Members 
of the administrative judiciary, appointed under the APA, exercise a 
judicial function tempered not by original jurisdiction under the law 
as in the courts, but, as with all executive branch agencies, by 
congressional delegation of legislative power and derivative 
regulation implemented by the agency.  It is within this cultural 
milieu that the issue of effective adjudicatory functioning arises; and 
it is here that many argue the adjudicatory process has faltered.  It is 
here where it must be rejuvenated. 
Part I of this Article explores the actions of the agency over time, 
both as related directly to the role of the administrative law judge in 
the case management process and to the agency's management of the 
backlog crisis generally, examining the cultural environment of 
bureaucratic management that has, despite the passage of decades, 
failed to remedy a persistent animus between the agency and its cadre 
of administrative law judges to the public detriment.  Part II next 
examines the core attributes of the managerial judge and contrasts 
this in Part III with the agency's handling of the backlog of disability 
appeals specifically.  Part IV examines the alternative of an 
independent corps of administrative law judges as a viable means to 
implement needed case management oversight and Part V 
summarizes the issues.  Appendix I highlights selected GAO reports 
focused on the agency's handling of the backlog; Appendix II lists 
pertinent GAO reports selected over a twenty-year period from 1989 
to 2009. 
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I. THE CHALLENGE: THE BACKLOG, THE JUDGES, AND THE AGENCY 
A. The Backlog, the Judges, and the Agency 
As of this writing, some 700,000 appeals8 are pending before 
ODAR—most being appeals of the agency's denial of disability 
claims.9  This represents almost twice the number of appeals that the 
agency acknowledges its hearings and appeals system is designed to 
handle in a timely and effective manner.10  The resultant delay in 
hearing and decisionmaking has given rise to numerous reports of 
human suffering and tragically poignant stories of desperation as 
Americans seeking much- needed benefits are told to wait.11  
                                                 
8 See Eliminating the Social Security Disability Backlog: Joint Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. and Subcomm. on Income Sec. & Family Support of 
the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 111th Cong. 134 (2009) (statement of Hon. 
Ronald G. Bernoski, President, Association of Administrative Law Judges), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg50764/pdf/CHRG-
111hhrg50764.pdf (“Towering over SSA is a backlog of over 765,000 cases 
claiming disability benefits under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security 
Act.”). 
9 See infra note 23 (discussing the administrative hearings and appeals process, 
in which the Social Security Act provides for a tiered decisionmaking/adjudicative 
process in disability appeals). 
10 SSA defines a backlog as a set of cases pending beyond an optimal projected 
number at the end of a given fiscal year. The Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) describes SSA's definition of a backlogged case as follows: 
 
SSA measures its claims processing performance at each 
level of the process in terms of the number of claims pending 
each year and the time it takes to issue a decision.  Since 1999, 
the agency has used a relative measure to determine the backlog 
by considering how many cases should optimally be pending at 
year-end.  This relative measure is referred to as “target pending” 
and is set for each level of the disability process with the 
exception of the reconsideration level. SSA's target pending is 
400,000 for claims at the initial stage and 300,000 and 40,000 for 
the hearings and Appeals Council stages, respectively. The 
number of pending claims at year-end that exceed these numbers 
represents the backlog. 
 
GAO-08-40, Better Planning, supra note 5, at 10. 
11 See, e.g., Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, 
and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2009: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
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Whether the framers of the Social Security Act envisioned the future 
scope and breadth of that which they originally conceived cannot 
truly be known. Today, SSA oversees the world's largest system of 
administrative adjudication with some 1,300 administrative law 
judges sited in 169 hearing offices throughout the United States.12  At 
issue are appeals from determinations by the agency under Title II 
and Title XVI of the Social Security Act,13  primarily related to 
determinations of entitlement to disability benefits. 
The original intent of the framers of the Social Security Act in 
their description of administrative decisionmaking—including 
adjudication—is made clear in a 1940 statement by the Social 
Security Board in which the Board described the anticipated 
decisionmaking model under the new Social Security Act “in terms 
of ‘simplicity and informality’ as well as ‘accuracy and fairness.”’14  
In the words of Paul Verkuil, “The decision model proposed by the 
Social Security Board was designed to make an enormously complex 
program work at low cost and with substantial public satisfaction.”15  
The goal identified is transparency in decisionmaking with sustained 
public approval in meeting the need for clear and timely 
administrative responses. Unfortunately, the lofty goals of the 1940s-
-to meet the needs of a nation poised on the brink of a new age--now 
lie buried, overwhelmed by numbers once not thought possible. 
An overview of the decisionmaking and appeals process through 
which an individual must progress is initially important to understand 
the context of the Social Security hearings and appeals 
process.  Under the Social Security Act, agency decisions with which 
a person disagrees proceed through a multistep decision and appeals 
                                                 
the Dep'ts of Labor, Health & Human Servs., Educ. & Related Agencies of the H. 
Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. 695, 764-66 (2008), available at 
http://www.c-c-d.org/task_forces/social_sec/CCD-House-Approps-testimony2-28-
08.pdf (Marty Ford, Co-Chair, Social Security Task Force Consortium for Citizens 
with Disabilities, testifying on reducing the backlog at SSA and on SSA's FY 2009 
budget overview). 
12 See Hearings and Appeals, Hearing Office Locator, Soc. Sec. Online, 
http://www.ssa.gov/appeals/ho_locator.html (last visited May 14, 2012). 
13 See 42 U.S.C. §901 (2006) (establishing the current independent executive 
branch agency we know as the Social Security Administration). 
14 Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 
COLUM. L. REV. 258, 270-71 (1978). 
15 Id. 
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process.  The Act establishes an individual right to a hearing in the 
event of disagreement with an agency decision.16  Four internal levels 
comprise the hearings and appeals process. A person aggrieved by an 
“initial determination” of the agency may seek “reconsideration.”17  
If after reconsideration a grievance yet remains, the individual may 
file a request for hearing before a federal administrative law judge.18  
The first two steps in this process are generally paper determinations 
with no personal inquiry or appearance by the claimant. When a 
request for hearing is made, the individual claimant is given the 
opportunity to appear before an administrative law judge, who, 
appointed under the APA,19  serves as an independent decisionmaker 
charged with making “findings of fact, and decisions as to the rights 
of any individual applying for a payment” under the Act.20  Upon 
conducting a hearing, the administrative law judge, acting under a 
delegation of authority from the Commissioner, “shall, on the basis 
of evidence adduced at the hearing, affirm, modify, or reverse the 
Commissioner's findings of fact and such decision.”21 
If the claimant disagrees with the decision of the administrative 
law judge he or she may file a “request for review” before the 
Appeals Council—once again, a paper review of the administrative 
law judge's hearing and findings.22  Upon review, the Appeals 
Council may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision of the 
administrative law judge.23  By statute, the aggrieved claimant who 
                                                 
16 42 U.S.C. §405(b). 
17 Id. §405(b)(3)(A). 
18 Id. §405(g). 
19 5 U.S.C. §3105 (2006). 
20 42 U.S.C. §405(b)(1). 
21 Id. 
22 See 20 C.F.R. §404.968 (2011). 
23 See Alan G. Skutt, Annotation, Provision of 42 USCS §405(g) Making 
Secretary of Health and Human Services' Findings of Fact Conclusive If Supported 
By Substantial Evidence as Applying to Administrative Law Judge or Social 
Security Appeals Council, 90 A.L.R. Fed. 280, 287, §2(a) (1988) (“[A]n individual 
seeking benefits from the Social Security Administration will, in the first instance, 
receive an initial determination by the agency either granting or denying benefits. If 
the individual is dissatisfied with the initial determination, he or she may request a 
reconsideration. The next step in the administrative appeal process is for the 
individual to file a request for a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). 
Once the ALJ has rendered a decision, the Social Security Appeals Council may 
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still disagrees with the decision of the agency may then seek judicial 
review.24 
At stake now is a crisis of pending appeals before administrative 
law judges—a backlog that has grown despite the agency's long-
standing knowledge of the problem.25  Repeated unsuccessful 
attempts by the agency to resolve this crisis have not stilled the cries 
of the waiting nor salved the pain of those who suffer.26  The hope of 
a helping hand has been lost in a system overburdened with 
bureaucratic initiative, underscored by a growing disenfranchisement 
of its judges. What was once intended to meet the needs of those who 
can no longer compete in the workplace has itself become a burden. 
 
                                                 
review the decision either on a motion of the individual, or on the motion of the 
Council itself pursuant to 20 CFR §404.969.” (footnote omitted)). 
24 42 U.S.C. §405(g). 
25 See GAO-08-40, Better Planning, supra note 5. 
 
Over the last decade, SSA experienced a substantial increase 
in its backlog of disability claims, with a particularly severe 
accumulation of claims at the hearing level.  From fiscal years 
1997 through 2006, the total number of backlogged claims--
numbers exceeding the level that should optimally be pending or 
in the pipeline at year-end--doubled.... In fiscal year 2006, 30 
percent of claims processed at the hearings stage alone, took 600 
days or more. 
 
Id. at 3. 
26 See, for example, the GAO commentary, which in a summary statement 
effectively describes SSA's repeated unsuccessful attempts to resolve the backlog: 
Finally, management weaknesses as evidenced by a number 
of initiatives that were not successfully implemented have limited 
SSA's ability to remedy the backlog.  Several initiatives 
introduced by SSA in the last 10 years to improve processing 
times and eliminate backlogged claims have, because of their 
complexity and poor execution, actually added to the 
problem.  For example, the “Hearings Process Improvement” 
initiative implemented in fiscal year 2000 significantly increased 
the days it took to adjudicate a hearings claim and exacerbated 
the backlog after the agency had substantially reduced it. 
 
Id. at 3-4. 
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B. The Judges 
Federal administrative law judges have been described as akin to 
federal district judges in the Judicial Branch.27  Administrative law 
judges serving in the Executive Branch derive their authority both 
from the APA and, by operation of such statute, derivatively from the 
agency head.28  As such they serve as neutral decisionmakers, 
charged with ensuring that appeals from agency action be handled in 
a fair, impartial, and timely manner. This has been described as the 
power to hear and decide. Significant debate, however, exists over 
the jurisprudential reach of an administrative law judge's mandate to 
hear and decide within ODAR.29 
At the outset, when considering this question in light of the 
overall role of judges within SSA, there is little question but that the 
agency's cadre of administrative law judges plays a vital role in 
resolving administrative appeals pending before the agency. 
In no small measure, however, can the agency's inability to avoid 
the current crisis—though it has been growing now for many years—
be said to be a direct result of the agency's, and derivatively, 
Congress's, unwillingness to empower its cadre of administrative law 
judges as was done in the federal courts when the Judicial Branch 
faced a similar crisis of rising costs and delay. 
Unlike the reformation of the federal courts in the 1990s with the 
enactment of the CJRA,30 proposals for reform within ODAR, 
including calls for a Social Security Court similar to that of the Court 
                                                 
27 See infra note 52. 
28 5 U.S.C. §556 (2006) provides in part: 
(b) There shall preside at the taking of evidence -- 
(1) the agency; 
(2) one or more members of the body which comprises the 
agency; or 
(3) one or more administrative law judges appointed under 
section 3105 of this title. 
29 See, e.g., Bernard Schwartz, Adjudication and the Administrative Procedure 
Act, 32 Tulsa L.J. 203, 212 (1996). 
30 28 U.S.C. §§471-482 (2006). As the U.S. Senate explained, the purpose of 
the Civil Justice Reform Act was “to promote for all citizens--rich or poor, 
individual or corporation, plaintiff or defendant--the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
resolution of civil disputes in our Nation's Federal courts.” S. Rep. No. 101-416, at 
1 (1990). 
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of Appeals for Veterans Claims, have been rejected. Also rejected 
was legislation designed to remove administrative law judges from 
the agencies in which they now function, establishing a separate 
adjudicative agency; arguably, some say, a necessary step to enable 
administrative law judges to return to the task of judging unhindered 
by unnecessary agency intervention and political agendas.31  These 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., John Holmes, In Praise of the ALJ System, Admin. & Reg. L. 
News, Summer 1996, at 3, 17. Holmes writes: 
 
A “Corps Bill” to house all ALJs under one roof has again 
been proposed in Congress but not acted on during the last 
session. Proponents allege that such a corps would assure 
independence from agency pressure, provide more efficient 
handling of caseloads since ALJs could be assigned on a gradual 
basis to those areas where more work has been generated, and 
would provide savings and efficiency through elimination of 
duplication of material and personnel. Opponents contend there 
would be a loss of expertise, alleged savings would be 
ephemeral, and that the proposed bill would shift political 
pressure to Congress. Some feel Social Security interests would 
eventually dominate such a “corps.” 
 
. . .  
 
A well trained, experienced cadre of ALJs exists which is 
well recognized and respected by practitioners for its judicial 
integrity, independence, and competence.  Not all decisions 
rendered by federal agencies need be subject to ALJ jurisdiction. 
Indeed, most decisions do not require hearing.  Others are 
amenable to non-judicial determination such as mediation or 
other alternative dispute resolution. However, when substantive 
rights of private parties are affected adversely by agency actions 
and/or controversy arises between private parties because of 
agency actions, a competent form of independent, impartial, final 
decisionmaking is required.  In my opinion, Congress should 
mandate and agencies should use more, rather than less, 
ALJs.  The best manner of obtaining a settlement of a dispute is 
where all parties are aware that they will obtain a fair, impartial 
hearing and a relatively prompt, analyzed decision on the merits. 
I also note earlier referenced attempts at passage of a so-
called administrative law judge Corps Bill, as set forth in the 
1983 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative 
Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the 
Judiciary.  Administrative Law Judge Corps Act: Hearing Before 
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issues are especially visible within SSA, which utilizes a greater 
number of administrative law judges than all other federal agencies 
combined.32  Despite calls for judicial empowerment, administrative 
law judges within the agency have found their jurisprudential reach 
                                                 
the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. (1983).  The purpose of that 
hearing was styled, “A Bill to Establish a Specialized Corps of 
Judges Necessary for Certain Federal Proceedings Required to be 
Conducted, and For Other Purposes.”  Id. In a statement before 
the Subcommittee, Professor Abraham Dash of the University of 
Maryland School of Law, in endorsing the bill, stated in part: 
I am very much for this bill, but I come here with some 
bewilderment.  Bewilderment that the Federal Government in 
1983 is still discussing this issue.  I know that the files of the 
committee must have the past record of this issue, but I would 
like to remind you of that history.  Back in 1936, more than 20 
years before the APA became law, we had the Norris and the 
Logan bill, which talked of an administrative court by 
consolidating our present article I courts with the hearing 
examiners.  This concept failed. Then you have the second 
Hoover commission of 1955, which recommended a centralized 
administrative hearing system.  I might note that the present bill, 
under consideration has some of the same principles in it as the 
Logan bill and Hoover commission report. 
The Hoover commission, as I said, in 1955 recommended 
much the same thing.  The Ash Council, in 1971, after another 
thorough study, talked in terms of an administrative court of 
appeals, and addressed this issue. 
In 1974, the Civil Service Commission report, I think it was 
known as the LaMacchia Committee, came out for a uniform 
corps of administrative law judges, after extensive study. 
In 1977, the Bork Committee of the Department of Justice 
came out for the same thing. In other words, I think the record is 
so replete with these recommendations after extensive studies, 
that it's amazing we haven't done anything about it at this time. 
 
Id. at 98; see also Rhonda McMillion, Autonomy for ALJs: Bills Would Create 
Independent Corps of Administrative Law Judges, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 103 
(“The problems that have beset the system, causing judges to sue their employing 
agencies, and employing agencies to pressure and threaten judges, are not caused 
by any one agency; they are the result of the conflict caused by housing judges in 
the very agency whose decisions they review” (quoting Judge Charles Bono, then-
President of the Association of Administrative Law Judges). 
32 See Schwartz, supra note 29, at 213 (showing a table of the distribution of 
administrative law judges across all federal agencies). 
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going in the other direction. 
Instead of empowering judges, the agency has gradually 
narrowed the judges' case management window, with the latest such 
action being implementation of regulations potentially curtailing the 
judge's ability to set the time and place of the hearing.  While not 
applicable to all judges in all circumstances, the regulation focuses 
on judges who are not functioning as it is perceived they should.33  
This action is unfortunately consistent with a long-standing animus 
between the agency and its cadre of judges, extending back to the late 
1970s when, in 1977, the Association of Administrative Law Judges 
filed an action before the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Missouri in response to agency-imposed quotas.34  While 
that action was settled with the promise of no future quotas, it did not 
prevent the agency from pursuing four separate actions against 
administrative law judges for low productivity in the 1980s.35 
Suffice it to say, the agency and its judges must find common 
professional ground.  Failure to do so has led to an ineffective long-
term resolution of case management issues, which in turn has led to 
the current backlog.  The critical inquiry when examining the history 
of today's pending administrative caseload is why the agency has not 
followed the example of the federal courts in the face of a growing 
backlog. Why has the agency not empowered its judges? A 
longitudinal view of the issues surrounding pending appeals before 
the earlier Bureau of Hearings and Appeals (BHA), the former Office 
of Hearings and Appeals (OHA), and now ODAR, leads an observer 
to conclude that the agency response to a growing caseload has been 
to pursue bureaucratic solutions and establish top-down control 
                                                 
33 See 20 C.F.R. §404.936(a) (2011), (providing that the agency, as opposed to 
the administrative law judge, “may” establish the time and place of the hearing: 
“We may set the time and place for any hearing. We may change the time and 
place, if it is necessary.”). 
34 Settlement Agreement, Bono v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Civ. No. 77-0819-CV-W-
4 (W.D. Mo. 1979), reprinted in Social Security Disability Reviews: The Role of 
the Administrative Law Judge: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of 
Gov't Mgmt. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong. 448 (1983). 
The Settlement Agreement signed by the parties provides, in part: “[The Office of 
Hearings and Appeals] will not issue directives or memoranda setting any specific 
number of dispositions by ALJs as quotas or goals.” Id. 
35 For a discussion of the action undertaken under the Bellmon Amendment, 
see infra note 46. 
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mechanisms with hoped-for control of both outcomes and activity. 
The result of such actions—whether intended or not--has been a 
narrowing of judges' responsibility for case management.  For 
example, as of this writing, despite years of a growing backlog and 
an increasing number of lawyers and nonlawyers representing 
claimants in such appeals, no overarching formal rules of procedure 
govern hearings before Social Security administrative law judges 
despite calls from the administrative judiciary to implement such 
rules.36  Instead, the agency has, over the span of several decades, 
invoked all manner of administrative “initiatives,” “process 
improvements,” and disability “re-engineering” efforts, few of which 
have involved the administrative judiciary, and few of which, as 
discussed herein, have actually accomplished the intended results.37  
Despite these efforts, the disability appeals backlog has grown to the 
point that many now suffer as a result of significant delay and 
unavailability of timely access to de novo appeal procedures before 
an administrative law judge following an administrative denial.38  
What was intended to be a transparent appeals process with attendant 
widespread public satisfaction has instead become an opaque, little-
understood adjudicatory mechanism whose outworkings have been 
characterized by at least one national disability law firm as 
antagonistic and intimidating.39 
                                                 
36 This is not to say that there are no regulations that govern such hearings. To 
the contrary, a regulatory structure exists, but effectively fails to accomplish long-
identified gaps, such as closing the evidentiary record following close of the 
hearing. See, e.g., Administrative Law Judge Hearing Procedures--General, 20 
C.F.R. §404.944 (2011). 
37 See GAO-08-40, Better Planning, supra note 5, at 3-4. 
38 A bevy of news reports abound. See, e.g., Disability Claims Spike, Mire 
Backlogged System, CBS News (May 18, 2010), http:// 
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/11/national/main6471596.shtml. 
39 The Binder & Binder Newsletter recites, “WE'LL DEAL WITH THE 
GOVERNMENT, YOU HAVE ENOUGH TO WORRY ABOUT.” Binder & 
Binder Monthly Newsletter, Binder & Binder, 
http://newsletter.binderandbinder.com/ (last visited May 14, 2012). The Binder & 
Binder Commercial Break further states, “Reminding you that we are, ‘America's 
Most Successful Social Security Disability Advocates' gives you a little sometimes 
necessary encouragement when you see our commercials....For the same reason, 
you like being reminded that we, ‘don't let anybody intimidate you.”’ Dick 
Summer, Commercial Break, Binder & Binder, 
http://005623d.netsolhost.com/prints/binder-and-binder-commercial-break.pdf (last 
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The single most significant signpost pointing toward this growing 
opacity in the disability appeals process--with a resultant inability to 
resolve the backlog--is the long history of conflict between the 
agency and its administrative law judges. This broken relationship 
has even drawn the notice of and comment from the blue-ribbon, 
presidentially-appointed Social Security Advisory Board. As recently 
as 2006, the Board urged both the agency and its judges to, in effect, 
bury the hatchet.40  That a presidential blue-ribbon advisory panel felt 
compelled to make such a comment is telling. Such notice is not, 
however, a new phenomenon. 
In 1978, the Social Security Administration departed from the 
                                                 
visited May 14, 2012). 
40 A 2006 report of the Social Security Advisory Board calls for reconciliation 
between the agency and its administrative law judges: 
 
In our 2001 report on the disability process, we noted a need 
to change SSA's relationship with its ALJs from one of 
confrontation to cooperation.  There is still a need to improve that 
relationship.  There is a residue of mistrust that goes back at least 
as far as the late 1970s, when pressures to reduce the number of 
allowances and increase the number of decisions led to a 
situation that was described as “an agency at war with itself.” 
Since then, many ALJs have resented what they saw as the 
agency's failure to consult them about changes that have been 
made. Lack of consultation on the Hearing Process Improvement 
initiative implemented in 2000 was a major factor lending 
support to the formation of the ALJ union. We believe that the 
SSA-ALJ relationship has improved more recently but still needs 
attention. 
The agency has much to gain from the advice and input of 
the dedicated professionals in the ALJ corps, at the national, 
regional, and hearing office levels.  The ALJ corps, in turn, needs 
to acknowledge the agency's legitimate desire to ensure that 
hearing decisions are made promptly and consistently.  There is 
an understandable and probably inevitable tension between the 
public's interest in decisional independence and the public's 
interest in consistency and efficiency, but we believe these 
interests can be reconciled.  We urge SSA and its ALJs to work 
together to develop reasonable procedures to reconcile them. 
 
Soc. Sec. Advisory Bd., Improving the Social Security Administration's Hearing 
Process 15 (2006) (footnote omitted), http:// 
ssab.gov/documents/HearingProcess.pdf. 
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plan laid down by its former Director of the Bureau of Hearings and 
Appeals, H. Dale Cook, who was appointed to the federal bench in 
1974.  In 1975, Robert Trachtenberg assumed office and plotted a 
new course.  During Director Cook's tenure, the agency expressed 
strong arguments in favor of APA applicability before the Civil 
Service Commission, specifically advancing the need for 
administrative law judges.  Under Director Trachtenberg, however, 
new initiatives were put into place, which drove the agency into a 
twenty-five-year period of tension with its judges.  Even the staff of 
the House Ways and Means Committee commented on the long 
history of conflict between administrative law judges and SSA 
management in the years since Director Trachtenberg's tenure: 
 
[T]he staff is concerned by the apparent state of 
BHA administration at the present time. Lawsuits 
have been filed by BHA employees concerning 
administration and a multitude of administrative 
charges have been instituted by both sides. It is an 
agency at war with itself. The management and rather 
substantial numbers of staff are devoting a great deal 
of their time attacking each other. This time could be 
better spent serving social security claimants.41 
 
The source of this ongoing animus arguably lies in a fundamental 
difference in worldview.  In effect, Director Trachtenberg changed 
the agency's culture by adopting a bureaucratic worldview and 
subsuming the judicial perspective.  The result has been both 
dramatic and, over time, detrimental to the agency's mission as first 
conceived.42  In considering the effect of this fundamental change, 
one must necessarily consider the function of those whom we call 
“bureaucrats.” Bureaucrats attempt to manage and control 
performance and outcomes to achieve politically designated goals. 
This concept is inherently anathema to the American ideal of a “fair” 
                                                 
41 Jeffrey Scott Wolfe, Are You Willing To Make The Commitment In 
Writing? The APA, ALJs, and SSA, 55 Okla. L. Rev. 203, 237-38 n.268 (2002) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Staff of Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. of the H. Comm. 
on Ways & Means, 96th Cong., Social Security Administrative Law Judges: 
Survey and Issue Paper 3 (Comm. Print 1979)). 
42 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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hearing that affords an individual fundamental due process rights 
before an independent decisionmaker who is to render an impartial 
decision and who is not bound by a predetermined political agenda in 
which value is placed on consistency and predictability.43 
Bureaucrats are less flexible in their actions with a 
correspondingly reduced ability to adapt to a changing environment 
with creativity and innovation.44  They are perceived as the mirror 
image of the American ideal of a fair-minded judge who acts not on a 
political agenda but who seeks the “right” result regardless of 
political cost. No citation of authority is needed to state that 
Americans seek a fair shot at overturning a prior unfavorable result. 
Fair play and due process are fundamental ideals of American 
culture. Americans are desirous of a fair opportunity to convince a 
                                                 
43 See, e.g., Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, Bureaucrats or Politicians? 
Part I: A Single Policy Task, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 169 (2007). Alesina and Tabellini 
note: 
 
A recent principal-agent literature addresses related issues in 
career-concerns models.  Mathias Dewatripont, Ian Jewitt, and 
Jean Tirole [ ] discuss the foundations of this approach and apply 
it to study the behavior of government agencies.  They focus on 
some issues related to ours, namely the nature and “fuzziness” of 
the agencies' mission, but they do not contrast bureaucratic and 
political accountability. Eric Maskin and Tirole [ ] investigate the 
attribution of responsibilities between accountable and 
nonaccountable agents. The latter have intrinsic motivations, 
while the former seek to please their principals because of 
implicit rewards (career concerns). In our set up, instead, we 
neglect the role of intrinsic motivations. Both bureaucrats and 
politicians need to be kept accountable with implicit incentives, 
but the implicit incentive schemes can be of two kinds: those that 
define a politician (striving for reelection), and those that define a 
bureaucrat (career concerns). Christian Schultz [ ] contrasts direct 
democracy, representative democracy, and bureaucratic 
delegation. Like Maskin and Tirole...he views bureaucrats as 
unaccountable and focuses on the trade-off between ideological 
polarization and accountability: bureaucrats are less polarized 
than partisan politicians, but are more inflexible since they are 
unaccountable and cannot be removed after shocks to the voters' 
policy preferences. 
 
Id. at 170 (emphasis added). 
44 Id. 
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neutral decisionmaker of the efficacy of their cause. In such a setting 
there is no external control or management over the outcome--only 
the doing of that which Americans cherish--the furthering of the 
ideals of justice and fair play.45  The growing tide of such appeals has 
strained a bureaucratically managed judicial system, a fact evident 
from the existence of the backlog itself. That the agency has 
attempted to bureaucratically manage a judicial system while 
withholding necessary tools from its judges, with singularly poor 
results, is evident from its actions dating back to the 1980s. In a 
strange scenario played out in reverse, the agency brought a 
challenge to its judges' decisionmaking when it implemented the so-
called Bellmon review.46  Judges whose “favorable” decision rate, 
                                                 
45 Nowhere is this more significant than in Social Security appeals 
proceedings. Unlike regulatory agencies, individual decisions by administrative law 
judges in Social Security cases do not determine agency policy. See Daniel J. 
Gifford, Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The Role of an Alternative 
Agency Structure, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965 (1991), in which the author notes 
the inherent difference between regulatory agencies which establish essential 
agency policy through individual precedential adjudications and mass-justice 
benefits agencies, such as SSA, where individual adjudications are not 
policymaking or precedential. 
 
For agencies with extremely large caseloads, typically no 
individual disposition decisions are salient in 
themselves.  Important issues of policy are resolved in generic 
rulemaking proceedings which produce standards governing 
behavior or the disposition of future cases.  This type of caseload, 
accordingly, tends to be centered on the resolution of factual 
disputes rather than policy issues.  For this type of caseload, 
adjudication of cases by a separate or quasi-separate 
administrative organ is the best response.  Indeed, in the case of 
large-scale benefit or other programs, the volume of adjudication 
may be so large as to render ineffective attempts to control policy 
through the administrative appellate review process. 
 
Id. at 998-99. 
In the mass-justice agency, rulemaking is the primary policymaking 
vehicle.  Unfortunately, SSA's reluctance to implement comprehensive Rules of 
Procedure place it in a role more akin to that of a regulatory agency, reserving the 
right of agency review of individual decisions as if same were precedential; which, 
of course, they are not, given the sheer number of cases decided. 
46 See U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/HRD-89-48BR, Results of 
Required Reviews of Administrative Law Judge Decisions (1989) [hereinafter 
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that is, whose reversal of underlying administrative denials reached 
70%, were targeted for disciplinary action, including “re-education” 
by the agency. In a series of legal actions challenging the agency's 
actions, individual administrative law judges argued the agency 
action violated the APA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, in Nash v. Bowen,47 described the agency action toward its 
administrative law judges as nothing short of coercion: 
 
The point is that the “Bellmon Review Program” 
is for all intents and purposes the same as the “Quality 
Assurance System” considered herein, i.e., the 
targeting and pressuring of ALJs with high allowance 
of benefit rates (a/k/a “reversal” rates) to fall into line 
or be subjected to disciplinary action. 
. . . . 
The Secretary's “reversal” rate policy embodied in 
the “Quality Assurance System,” however, is cause 
for concern. To coerce ALJs into lowering reversal 
rates--that is, into deciding more cases against 
claimants--would, if shown, constitute in the district 
                                                 
GAO/HRD-89-48BR, Required Reviews]. The Report notes: 
 
Social Security disability claimants whose initial benefit 
applications are denied may appeal through several layers of 
administrative and judicial processes.  However, the appeal 
process is very time-consuming.  For some claimants, even 
favorable decisions by administrative law judges (ALJs) are 
delayed because they are chosen at random for further review by 
the Social Security Administration's (SSA's) Appeals Council.  In 
many cases the delay is only a month or so, but some cases are 
delayed several months while subsequent appeals are considered. 
This random review process is carried out under the Bellmon 
Amendment (96-265, sec. 304(g)) passed in 1980.  Early reviews 
under the amendment were directed at ALJs who issued 
favorable decisions in 70 percent or more of their cases and were 
so controversial they led to a lawsuit by the Association of 
ALJs.  The controversy and lawsuit resulted in restrictions on the 
use of Bellmon review data that limited the program's value for 
quality assurance purposes. 
 
Id. at 1. 
47 869 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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court's words “a clear infringement of decisional 
independence.”48 
 
Rather than focus upon the issues that have traditionally 
concerned judicial case management--rising costs and increasing 
delays--the agency, in implementing the Bellmon review, seemed 
animated by the political question of whether too many were being 
granted benefits.  The “bureaucratic” concern thus evidenced was 
improperly placed on the outcome of the case by questioning the 
substantive performance of the judges rather than modifying the 
underlying criteria for award of Social Security benefits, with little 
attendant concern for the growing backlog. This example portrays the 
agency's misplaced emphasis, especially in a system where individual 
adjudicative decisions do not affect overall Social Security policy. It 
is a revealing window into the agency's cultural environment. 
To set due process as an overarching goal requires a cogent, well-
defined infrastructure, free of political interference.  It becomes an 
even more complex undertaking if burdened by politically driven 
outcomes.  As a matter of practical jurisprudence, due process in 
American juridical systems occurs within a human system whose 
defining characteristics embody concepts of justice and fair play 
tempered by compassion.  Considering both the black letter of the 
law and the otherwise real context of disparate human life, the 
American ideal of justice necessarily asks, What is the right thing to 
do?  This is a decision often sheltered in gradations of gray.  This is 
especially so in the fact-intensive undertaking made by federal 
administrative law judges in Social Security disability 
appeals.  These essential American ideals run contrary to the demand 
for control, political consistency, and predictability inherent in 
modern notions of a politically-animated bureaucracy.  Here lies the 
impetus, if not the roadblock, to change in Social Security's disability 
appeals system.  What is required is a fundamental cultural change 
within the agency's worldview, ending the “Trachtenberg Era,” 
whose legacy dates to 1975, and beginning anew an era in which 
politically independent judges, and not agency managers, administer 
a judicial system. 
 
                                                 
48 Id. at 679, 681. 
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C. The Agency 
Viewed from a wider perspective, the agency's apparent historical 
animus toward its administrative law judges and the corresponding 
resistance by judges to the demanded predictability of bureaucratic 
and politically motivated outcomes appears to rest squarely on 
inherent tensions that arise in the placement of a judicial system 
within an executive branch bureaucracy.  These tensions are 
exacerbated by the agency's seeming confusion of roles--treating 
what are fact-intensive hearings as if such hearings were 
policymaking--when, as a matter of Executive Branch functioning, 
such hearings cannot by definition play such a role.  The sheer 
number of such hearings belies such a result.49 
In advocating such a view, one necessarily embraces the 
attendant corollary: the goals, worldview, and functioning of 
bureaucracies fundamentally differ from those of judicial 
systems.  And while one might argue the system of adjudication 
mandated by the APA50 necessarily places administrative law judges 
inside the bounds of executive branch agencies, the sheer size of the 
modern adjudicatory system of disability appeals exceeds that 
envisioned in 1946 when the APA was passed--most certainly by 
several orders of magnitude.51  The growth of this system of 
administrative adjudication—populated not primarily by “managers” 
but by legally trained professionals serving in a role likened to that of 
the federal judiciary52—has fundamentally changed the system as 
                                                 
49 See 5 U.S.C. §3105 (2006). 
50 5 U.S.C. §§554, 556 (2006). 
51 For example, in Richardson v. Perales, the Supreme Court first noted that 
“over 20,000 disability claim hearings [are held] annually.” 402 U.S. 389, 406 
(1971). To the Court, this was a “structure of great and growing complexity”: 
“Neither are we persuaded by the advocate-judge-multiple-hat suggestion. It 
assumes too much and would bring down too many procedures designed, and 
working well, for a governmental structure of great and growing complexity.” Id. at 
410. Today, more than thirty times as many appeals are pending. One cannot but 
wonder whether the Court would, today, declare that the disability appeals system 
is “working well” as it did in 1971. 
52 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (noting that an 
administrative law judge performs a “functionally comparable” role to a judge and 
that “the process of agency adjudication is currently structured so as to assure that 
the hearing examiner exercises his independent judgment on the evidence before 
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originally envisioned. Despite this evolutionary change, Social 
Security “managers” continue to circumscribe the role of the 
administrative judiciary, seeking greater control over its members as 
the spiraling backlog continues.53  Administrative law judges, 
foreclosed from many of the procedural tools they deem necessary to 
accomplish the task before them, seek to improve their professional 
functioning as judges. The result? A clash of worldviews, resulting in 
                                                 
him, free from pressures by the parties or other officials within the agency.”). A 
number of lower court decisions have echoed the Butz ruling, reaffirming the 
Court's declaration that “the risk of an unconstitutional act by one presiding at an 
agency hearing is clearly outweighed by the importance of preserving the 
independent judgment of these men and women.” Id. at 514. 
53 The situation brings to mind the counter-intuitive lessons in learning to fly, 
and more particularly, learning to escape a spin. In the words of an Army pilot: 
 
One of the maneuvers that I was taught was how to put the 
plane into a spin and bring it back to level flight.  It was fairly 
easy to start the spin, we just slowed the plane down and pulled 
the nose up so that it was not hardly flying and it would begin the 
spin. 
Now came the hard part, getting it back to straight and level 
flight.  This plane was pointed almost straight down at the ground 
and spinning.  The natural inclination was to take the stick and, if 
the spin was to the right, pull the plane back to the left.  But, if 
we did this, it would begin spinning to the left and in a tighter 
spin. 
The way to get this plane out of the spin and back flying the 
way it was supposed to fly was to take your feet off of the pedals 
and let go of the stick.  If you did this, it would just fly its self 
right out of the spin and back to normal flight.  If you would fight 
with the plane, it would continue to spin until it crashed into the 
ground. 
Learning to do that was one of the hardest things that I had 
to learn in all of flight school.  Learning to let go and let it 
happen. 
 
See Stay In the Now, I've Got You, Happyness Is a Choice.com, http:// 
happynessisachoice.com/articles/acceptance/stay.  The lesson illustrates human 
nature generally, and describes agency behavior as regards the administrative 
judiciary, specifically.  A natural, virtually instinctive response when faced with 
crisis is to seize control and attempt to do something.  It is counter-intuitive to let 
go.  Rather than let go and thereby avoid a crash, agency managers have grasped an 
even tighter hold, effectively ignoring the solution of letting go (and unleashing the 
talents of its administrative law judge corps). 
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ongoing calls from the Social Security Advisory Board, the American 
Bar Association, and the Association of Administrative Law Judges 
to resolve these differences. Setting aside the arguments on each side, 
it is at bottom an animus ill-suited to the task of public service so 
significantly involving the welfare of the American people. 
At this juncture in American history, the situation is 
straightforward, if not difficult to embrace.  The Nation's disability 
appeals system has grown beyond its founding roots.  The evolution 
of the system of disability benefits began with a fundamental shift in 
national perspective in 1935 with the passage of the Social Security 
Act.54  In the midst of the Great Depression, Americans in a 
competitive, capitalist society gained an assurance that their 
contributions as American workers would not go unrewarded, such 
that a small benefit was made available upon retirement, which today 
has become a mainstay of millions of Americans in their elder years. 
In the 1950s, Americans recognized that this same benefit should be 
extended to those not yet of retirement age but who, because of 
disabling physical or mental conditions, could no longer compete in 
order to meet minimum daily needs for sustenance and shelter. This 
benefit, too, has gained a significant place in American society.55 
While retirement benefits are generally a function of numerical 
analysis (quarters paid, amounts earned, etc.), the question of 
entitlement to disability benefits is far more subjective--embracing 
legal, vocational, and medical issues--and is often open to varying 
interpretation.  By operation of law, the subjective nature of these 
determinations warrants an opportunity to be heard--to present 
evidence and testimony in aid of the claim. 
As discussed herein, arguably, the ability of the agency to meet 
the demands of this due process requirement has been outstripped by 
the need for greater and greater numbers of such hearings, resulting 
in a hearings backlog of such duration and extent that it is now a 
                                                 
54 For an historical overview of the Social Security Act and history leading to 
that point in time, see Historical Background and Development of Social Security, 
Soc. Sec. Online. (Dec. 6, 2011), http:// www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html 
(last modified Dec. 6, 2011). 
55 See A History of the Social Security Disability Programs, Soc. Sec. Online. 
(1986), http://www.ssa.gov/history/1986dibhistory.html (last visited May 14, 
2012). 
    
160        Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary          33-1 
“crisis.”56  As a result, it is important to recognize the systemic 
inadequacy of the bureaucratic worldview: the demand by the agency 
upon its judges for resolution of dramatically increased numbers of 
pending disability appeals has not resulted in a wider empowerment 
of administrative law judges by the agency but has instead seen the 
agency invoke repeated nonjudicial attempts to remedy the situation 
while simultaneously narrowing the role of the administrative law 
judge. This is no more plainly illustrated than by the recent change in 
regulation potentially limiting the ability of the administrative law 
judge to set his or her own docket.57 
 
II. JUDGING AND THE EFFECTIVE DISPOSITION OF CASES: THE 
MANAGERIAL JUDGE, THE CJRA, AND THE FRCP 
Judging and effective disposition of cases are invariably functions 
of caseload management--a task historically associated with the 
professional functioning of judges.  In this, the lessons from the 
federal courthouses are instructive in the current Social Security 
backlog crisis. 
In the late 1970s and '80s, increasing caseloads and resulting 
delays in the United States courts brought this reality into focus: to be 
effective, a judge was no longer simply required to hear the evidence 
in an individual case, ensure justice was done, and make a decision 
when the parties indicated the case was ripe for decision.  Leaving 
the pace of the litigation to the parties often resulted in unwelcome 
delay as one party sought--for both tactical and strategic reasons--to 
                                                 
56 See, e.g., U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-02-322, Social Security 
Disability: Disappointing Results from SSA's Efforts to Improve the Disability 
Claims Process Warrant Immediate Attention (2002) [hereinafter GAO-02-322, 
Disappointing Results]. The GAO stated, in part: 
 
This [Hearing Process Improvement] initiative was 
implemented nationwide in 2000.  The initiative has not 
improved the timeliness of decisions on appeals; rather, it has 
slowed processing in hearings offices from 318 days to 336 days. 
As a result, the backlog of cases waiting to be processed has 
increased substantially and is rapidly approaching crisis levels. 
 
Id. at 3. 
57 Compare 20 C.F.R. §404.936 (2010), with 20 C.F.R. §404.936 (2011). 
    
Spring 2013          Civil Justice Reform in Social Security Adjudications 161 
slow the litigation process to the detriment of his opponent.  This 
resulted in a growing perception that the judicial system was 
unresponsive to societal needs.  Calls were made for change from 
within the system.  The role of the effective judicial officer was seen 
as changing to fulfill the equitable maxim, “Justice delayed is justice 
denied.”58  Doing so meant learning to engage in proactive pretrial 
case management in an effort to bring pending cases to a more swift 
resolution. Then-Chief Judge Robert Peckham, of the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of California, makes the point plainly: 
 
Traditionally, judges have been depicted solely as 
dispensers of justice, weighing opposing evidence and 
legal arguments on their finely-calibrated scales to 
mete out rewards and punishments. Until quite 
recently the trial judge played virtually no role in a 
case until counsel for at least one side certified that it 
was ready for trial. But today's massive volume of 
litigation and the skyrocketing costs of attorney's fees 
and other litigation expenses have, by necessity, cast 
the trial judge in a new role, that of pretrial manager.59 
 
The judge as pretrial manager views his or her role in the light of 
increasing caseloads with attendant increases in the cost of access to 
courts and resultant delay once there.  This worldview is both 
specific to the needs of individual cases as well as societal 
recognition that delays in individual cases result in system-wide 
general delay.  As one writer observes: 
 
Advocates of managerial judging point to several 
indications that action is needed.  They cite the 
growing caseload of the federal judiciary.  They 
express concern with the changing nature of civil 
litigation: new causes of action have expanded the 
judicial role and challenged the limits of judges to 
                                                 
58 The Yale Book of Quotations 312 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006) (quoting 
William E. Gladstone, British Prime Minister (1868-1894)). 
59 Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in 
Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770, 770 (1981). 
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reform institutions and to remedy social ills.  More 
recently, the rising cost of civil litigation has come to 
the fore as a major justification for managerial 
judging. 
For now, it is not important to debate whether any 
of the purported justifications for managerial judging 
are valid.  What is more important is to recognize that 
the advocates of managerial judging are making a 
fundamental critique of the existing procedural 
regime.  The present structure of civil procedure, they 
say, necessarily fails to achieve its self-proclaimed 
goal of “the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination” of controversies if left to its own 
devices.60 
 
Faced with institutional erosion in the form of increasing costs 
and delays, the courts recognized a critical need to broaden the 
judicial role to encompass the entire life cycle of a case, from the 
moment of its filing to its eventual disposition.61  No longer was the 
judge to be a passive participant awaiting word from the lawyers that 
the case was now ready for trial. This was evident in the passage of 
the CJRA. 
The CJRA was enacted “to promote for all citizens--rich or poor, 
individual or corporation, plaintiff or defendant--the just, speedy and 
inexpensive resolution of civil disputes in our Nation's federal 
courts,”62 in recognition of a growing concern by federal judges that 
“a litigation explosion was taking place in the federal courts, 
                                                 
60 E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 306, 309-10 (1986) (footnotes omitted). 
61 See Carl Tobias, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, 50 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 89, 90 (1993) (“Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act 
during 1990 because of mounting concern over abuse in civil litigation, particularly 
in the discovery process; the growing costs of resolving civil lawsuits; and 
decreasing federal court access in those cases. For a decade and a half, many 
federal judges, led by Chief Justice Warren Burger, had contended that the federal 
judiciary was experiencing a litigation explosion and increasing discovery and 
litigation abuse.” (footnote omitted)). 
62 S. Rep. No. 101-416, at 1 (1990). 
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resulting in increased discovery and litigation abuse.”63 
The legislative history indicates that the central purpose of the 
Civil Justice Reform Act is to accomplish the often stated but 
frequently unachieved goal of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure: to ensure the “just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination” of civil disputes in federal courts. The legislative 
history notes that “[h]igh costs, long delays and insufficient judicial 
resources all too often leave this time-honored promise unfulfilled. 
By improving the quality of the process of civil litigation, this 
legislation will contribute to improvement of the quality of justice 
that the civil justice system delivers.”64 
Integral to the implementation of the CJRA are core concepts of 
managerial judging such that district judges working with required 
CJRA Advisory Committees within each of the ninety-four federal 
districts were to devise individual cost and delay reduction plans, to 
be implemented within the district through “adoption of the specific 
methods of litigation management and cost and delay reduction.”65 
These concepts of judicial management included: 
 
• “early and ongoing judicial management of cases” 
• “management of the discovery process” 
• “authorizing judges to explore settlement in complex 
cases and requiring parties to have attorneys with 
settlement authority present at conferences” 
• “‘systematic [and] differential treatment of civil 
cases that tailors the level of individualized and case 
specific management’ to factors including ‘case 
complexity, the amount of time reasonably needed to 
prepare the case for trial, and the judicial and other 
resources required and available for the preparation 
and disposition of the case.”’66 
                                                 
63 Carl Tobias, Executive Branch Civil Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 
1521, 1524 (1993). 
64 Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 
MINN. L. REV. 375, 390 (1992) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting 
S. Rep. No. 101-416, at 1 (1990)). 
65 Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Reform: Juggling Between Politics and 
Perfection, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 833, 843-45 (1994). 
66 Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 
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Review of the original report67 giving rise to the CJRA captures 
the essence of the revolution in judicial activism that the Act sought 
to encourage: CJRA plans “should also recognize that there has not 
been adequate utilization of available and existing tools to respond to 
this substantially changed civil litigation system, to control cost and 
delays.”68  The legislation thus sought to: 
 
(1) Build reform from the bottom up; 
(2) Promulgate a national, statutory policy in support of judicial 
case management; 
(3) Impose greater controls on the discovery process; 
(4) Establish differentiated case management systems; 
(5) Improve motions practice and reduce undue delays 
associated with decisions on motions; and 
(6) Expand and enhance the use of alternative dispute 
resolution.69 
 
In so acting, Congress sought to encourage proactive judicial 
involvement in all federal civil actions, adopting a national public 
policy calling for creative judicial management of civil litigation at 
an early stage in the proceedings to curb cost and delay.  Congress 
demanded that federal judges abandon a passive stance and no longer 
leave to counsel the decision to signal when a case is ready for 
trial.  Instead, early hands-on judicial case management was to 
extend to the case from the moment of its filing, involving the 
assigned judge at the beginning of the litigation to ensure effective, 
efficient, and timely case management, and ultimately a less costly 
disposition without undue delay. 
For the agency the question of effective judicial involvement by 
federal administrative law judges in case management is a question 
of an expanded judicial role.  The nature of the backlog crisis is 
                                                 
46 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1456-60 (1994) (footnote omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§473(a)(1) (2006)). 
67 See Brookings Inst. Task Force on Civil Justice Reform, Justice For All: 
Reducing Costs and Delay in Civil Litigation (1989); see also Robel, supra note 
66, at 1450. 
68 See Robel, supra note 66, at 1460. 
69 Mullenix, supra note 64, at 391 (quoting S. Rep. No. 101-416, at 15 (1990)). 
    
Spring 2013          Civil Justice Reform in Social Security Adjudications 165 
described by the same problems federal courts confronted and whose 
resolution was and remains a logical response.  Professor Judith 
Resnik frames the issue in her 1982 seminal article, Managerial 
Judges.  Quoting both the Commentary of the Mishnah and the 
Preface to the Manual for Complex Litigation, Professor Resnik 
offers pithy guidance to the problem of case management, evincing a 
philosophical notion of the proper judicial role: 
 
Should you be called upon to function as a judge, 
do not be like the legal advisors who offer to place 
their juridical knowledge at the service of the 
litigating parties. . . . [Y]ou must remain silent and 
abstain from interference in the arguments . . . . Do 
not by even so much as a gesture seek to influence 




There are no inherently protracted cases, only 
cases which are unnecessarily protracted by inefficient 
procedures and management.70 
 
The traditional judicial role stands out against the emergent 
judicial role of judge-as-pretrial-case-manager.  Professor Resnik 
observes that the modern judicial role encompasses a view of judicial 
activity as extending from the filing of the case to its ultimate 
disposition.71  She describes this then-new role as “shepherding the 
case to completion.”72  Shepherding contemplates greater familiarity 
with the case at a much earlier time in the life of the litigation. In 
this, she asserts judicial management is the new form of “judicial 
activism” but warns that such “judicial management may be teaching 
judges to value their statistics, such as the number of case 
dispositions, more than they value the quality of their decisions.”73  
                                                 
70 Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376 (1982) 
(alterations in original). 
71 Id. at 378. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 380. 
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She nevertheless acknowledges that the world of judging has, indeed, 
changed: 
 
Today the unhyphenated “pretrial” is a stage unto 
itself, no longer a prelude to trial but rather assumed 
to be the way to end a case without trial. Today's rule 
brims with details about what judges are supposed to 
do, including establishing “early and continuing 
control,” organizing discovery, “facilitating the 
settlement of the case,” and referring parties in 
appropriate instances to “special procedures” (such as 
arbitration or mediation) “to assist in resolving the 
dispute.” In the contemporary rule, we find the 
managerial judge, the settlement judge, the 
dealmaking judge, [and] the judge promoting 
alternative dispute resolution.74 
 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as amended undeniably 
reflect this proactive approach beginning with Rule 1, which 
establishes a lens through which the balance of the Rules—and 
correspondingly, the actions thereunder—are to be viewed: “[The 
Rules] should be construed and administered to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding.”75  Rule 16, as Professor Resnik notes, provides for 
detailed management of every civil action, requiring, in part: 
 
In any action, the court may order the attorneys 
and any unrepresented parties to appear for one or 
more pretrial conferences for such purposes as: 
 
(1) expediting disposition of the action; 
(2) establishing early and continuing control so 
that the case will not be protracted because of 
lack of management; 
                                                 
74 Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the 
Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 937 (2000) (emphasis omitted) 
(footnote omitted). 
75 Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. 
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(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities; 
(4) improving the quality of the trial through 
more thorough preparation, and; 
(5) facilitating settlement.76 
 
Rule 16 further requires entry of a scheduling order “as soon as 
practicable, but in any event within the earlier of 120 days after any 
defendant has been served with the complaint or 90 days after any 
defendant has appeared.”77  Entry of a scheduling order is thus 
mandatory. A pretrial conference may then address a variety of 
matters, including “special procedures for managing potentially 
difficult or protracted actions” and “facilitating in other ways the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive disposition of the action.”78  In the words of 
one writer, 
 
Rule 16 is explicitly intended to encourage the 
active judicial management of the case development 
process and of trial in most civil actions.  Rule 16 calls 
on judges to fix deadlines for completing the major 
pretrial tasks and encourages judges to actively 
participate in designing case-specific plans for 
positioning litigation as efficiently as possible for 
disposition by settlement, motion, or trial.  Rule 16 
authorizes and regulates use of a wide range of case 
management tools and powers--principally through 
pretrial conferences.  It also authorizes a wide range of 
sanctions for violations of pretrial orders.79 
 
The managerial judge in the federal court is thus equipped with 
the tools to engage in proactive case management from the outset of 
litigation, able to reach into his or her quiver and bring forth a variety 
of arrows in an attempt to resolve the case before trial; or if not, to 
                                                 
76 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16. 
77 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(2). 
78 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2), (2)(L), (2)(P). 
79 3 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 16-1 (3d ed. 2011); see 
also Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Authorized Managerialism Under the Federal Rules--
And the Extent of Convergence With Civil-Law Judging, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 191, 
196 (2007). 
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resolve the case in a timely manner in the courtroom.  Effective 
judging is seen to embrace effective--that is, timely--and just case 
disposition.  Among the options available are various pretrial 
settlement mechanisms including ENEs (early neutral evaluations), 
mini-trials, summary jury trials, and settlement conferences.  This is 
further encouraged by the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 
1998,80 which provides that every U.S. District Court “shall devise 
and implement its own alternative dispute resolution program, by 
local rule adopted under section 2071(a), to encourage and promote 
the use of alternative dispute resolution in its district.”81 
A principal player behind the codification of judicial management 
as reflected in the CJRA was then-United States Senator Joseph 
Biden, who as Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
commissioned the Brookings Institution in conjunction with the 
Foundation for Change to form a “task force to ‘develop a set of 
recommendations to alleviate the problems of excessive cost and 
delay.”’82  The findings of the task force became the basis for the 
CJRA.83 
In 1994, then-Senator Biden wrote in the Stanford Law Review: 
 
For many years, the federal courts were the 
preferred forum for many litigants, but recently public 
confidence in the federal courts' ability to provide the 
“just, inexpensive, and speedy determination of every 
action” has begun to erode. . . . Court congestion has 
become pronounced, particularly for civil cases, as 
crowded dockets and inefficient procedures combine 
to make litigation expensive and delays lengthy. As a 
result, economic concerns rather than the merits of a 
                                                 
80 28 U.S.C. §651 (2006). 
81 Id. §651(b). Rule 23 also authorizes extensive judicial management 
procedures in class actions by conferring broad authority to make appropriate 
orders to determine the course of the proceedings or prescribe measures to prevent 
undue repetition or complication in presenting evidence or argument, in addition to 
conferring authority to make appropriate orders to deal with similar procedural 
matters. Rowe, supra note 79, at 196-97. 
82 Johnston, supra note 65, at 837 (quoting Brookings Inst. Task Force on Civil 
Justice Reform, supra note 67, at vii). 
83 Id. 
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case too often govern the decision to file a civil suit. 
In a society where access to justice is implicit in our 
Bill of Rights, the closing of the courthouse doors to 
ordinary citizens threatens not only the judicial 
system's operation, but also the integrity of the 
democratic system.84 
 
Then-Senator Biden thus viewed as critical the need for active 
and expanded judicial management of civil cases as a means to 
reverse a growing delay of such magnitude as to effectively close the 
courthouse doors to the majority of the American people--a virtual 
collapse of the system of justice if unchecked.  The CJRA was 
necessary to “restore public confidence.”85  Of particular note was 
the perceived need for congressional action. As with the current crisis 
confronting SSA, Senator Biden wrote of the federal court system: 
 
These consensus-building efforts would have been 
futile without the legislature's involvement.  Prior to 
the CJRA's enactment, the federal judiciary's recent 
history was replete with proposals to reform the civil 
justice system from groups such as the American Bar 
Association, the Association of Trial Lawyers of 
America, and the American Law Institute. Yet despite 
the warning bells and the calls for change from both 
inside and outside the judiciary, the rule changes 
recommended to Congress by the Judicial Conference 
remained largely ineffectual.86 
 
The lessons from the federal courthouse apply equally to the 
backlog crisis now facing the agency and ultimately, the American 
people.  Those who assess the proactive role of the modern federal 
judge agree, “If judges did not intervene in the morass that is modern 
litigation, this would clog dockets, increase litigation costs, and free 
litigants to use litigation's expense and delay to gain unfair tactical 
                                                 
84 Biden, supra note 1, at 1285-86 (emphases added) (footnotes omitted). 
85 Id. at 1286. 
86 Id. at 1291 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (noting that the American 
Bar Association, Association of Trial Lawyers of America, and the American Law 
Institute all had proposals to reform the civil justice system). 
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advantages over their adversaries.”87  Why is it different for the 
backlog now facing the agency? 
In Judge Peckham's words: 
 
Pretrial management of cases has become a 
necessary device for dealing with our judicial system's 
bursting calendars.  It has proven to be an advantage 
to litigants and not merely a necessary evil.  The 
scheduling function served by the early status 
conference has proven to be a particularly effective 
device for increasing the productivity of courts and 
minimizing the cost of litigation.  Moreover, in the 
pursuit of efficiency we have discovered a way to 
improve our trials by making them better organized 
and, I believe, more comprehensible to the lay juror. . 
. .  Pretrial properly focuses the action on the search 
for truth rather than on gamesmanship.88 
 
The solution adopted by the courts to growing delay and 
increasing costs (with a resultant lack of public access to and 
confidence in the federal courts) was to expand the active role of the 
judge in case management, beginning at the initial filing of the case 
through to completion.  These measures allow the judge to bring his 
or her full decisionmaking power to bear in the whole of the case--
from its inception to completion--enabling greater flexibility and 
creativity in handling and disposing of cases throughout the 
litigation.  Case resolution is no longer limited simply to disposition 
by trial, or by prolonged traditional methods employed by counsel, 
who by definition could not effectively resolve delay caused by a 
recalcitrant opponent absent court intervention.89 
These same solutions can and should be applied to the backlog 
crisis now threatening public confidence in and access to the Nation's 
                                                 
87 Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 
YALE L.J. 27, 42 (2003). 
88 Peckham, supra note 59, at 804-05. 
89 Delay for the sake of delay often benefits the defendant in an adversarial 
proceeding, for delay maintains the status quo ante, enables the passage of time, the 
fading of memory, and the disappearance of evidence and witnesses. See, e.g., 
Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 918 (Cal. 1997). 
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system of disability claims and appeals. Effective judging requires 
effective case management. Administrative law judges, before whom 
hundreds of thousands of Americans appear each year, should be 
enabled to apply the full measure of their ability to decide through 
the life of the case--from the time a request for hearing is filed to 
entry of a final decision. Effective case management tools should be 
formulated and rules enacted, enabling members of the 
administrative judiciary within the agency to take an expanded and 
proactive role in the life of all cases that they will ultimately decide. 
The question is, why not empower administrative law judges with 
effective case management tools from the outset of a case? 
 
III. ADJUDICATORY INERTIA WITHIN THE AGENCY  
To answer the question requires the asking of yet another 
question.  Why has the case management role of the administrative 
judiciary within the agency narrowed rather than grown in response 
to a growing backlog?  What has prevented the agency from 
expanding the role of judges in addressing pending hearings?  The 
answers to these questions require an understanding of the 
adjudicatory inertia that pervades the agency's approach to problem 
solving.90 
The crisis now facing the agency finds its genesis in a long 
history of attempts to redress a growing caseload through 
management-driven initiatives and process improvements, which did 
not result in any effective solution to the problem but did serve to 
further isolate the agency's cadre of administrative law judges from 
the problem-solving roundtable.  The collective results of these 
various management-driven solutions have served to cement the 
agency into a pattern of adjudication little changed since the 1970s. 
The true measure of the extent of this adjudicatory stasis is seen 
in the agency's multiple remedial attempts, resulting not in a 
reduction of the growing backlog but in an escalation of the problem 
to crisis proportions.  Review of these various process improvements 
and initiatives shows that all are bureaucratic add-ons--programs 
largely outside the adjudicatory framework, described in their best 
                                                 
90 When examining these issues it is also necessary to examine pertinent GAO 
findings verbatim, and so excerpts from such reports are reproduced here in order 
to better understand and communicate the context of the findings. 
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light as parallel attempts to address the pending caseload with little or 
no judicial involvement in either their inception or implementation. 
Succinctly stated, the agency has not sought to change an 
adjudicatory model that has subsisted in its present form for more 
than fifty years. Given the failure of management-driven solutions, 
the present backlog augurs for just such a change. When first 
devised, the hearings process was conceived as nonadversarial, 
adopting an inquisitorial jurisprudence akin to that found in judicial 
systems in continental Europe. Professor Robert M. Viles undertook 
a comprehensive study of the Social Security disability system in 
1968.91  He describes the hearing procedure in the words of one 
hearing examiner: 
 
In 99% of the cases, people come in without any 
representation.  It is my job to represent those people 
when they come in.  It seems strange, but we use the 
terminology that we ‘wear three hats.’ We put on the 
first hat, and we represent the claimant, we present all 
the testimony on his behalf, and drag it out of him by 
questioning. We then represent the government, the 
Social Security Administration, and search the law--
that's the second hat. We search our minds, and we 
search whatever other records are available, we search 
the evidence, and we present the best case that the 
government has. Then we turn around and put on the 
third hat, and we decide which evidence is most 
favorable, and in whose behalf.92 
 
This model remains today despite the fact that the number of 
pending appeals has grown nationally from 20,000 in 197193 to over 
                                                 
91 Robert M. Viles, The Social Security Administration Versus the Lawyers ... 
And Poor People Too (pts. 1 & 2), 39 MISS. L.J. 371 (1968), 40 MISS. L.J. 24 
(1968). 
92 40 MISS. L.J. at 40-41 (quoting Rausch v. Gardner, 267 F. Supp. 4, 6 (E.D. 
Wis. 1967)). 
93 See, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 406 (1971) (“With over 
20,000 disability claim hearings annually, the cost of providing live medical 
testimony at those hearings, where need has not been demonstrated by a request for 
a subpoena, over and above the cost of the examinations requested by hearing 
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700,000 today, and the percentage of persons represented by counsel 
has grown to almost 80%.94  Hearing examiners are now 
administrative law judges, but as recently as 2000, the U.S. Supreme 
Court recognized the inquisitorial nature of the administrative 
hearing undertaken by Social Security administrative law judges.95 
The push by administrative law judges for expanded case 
management authority has sparked a debate over the question of 
judicial independence under the APA.96  The agency's view is 
straightforward. An administrative law judge's role is strictly limited 
to “decisional-independence,” restricting the judge to conducting the 
hearing and thereby largely reserving to the agency prehearing case 
management. Under this view, the agency reserves to itself the right 
to frame a judge's functioning within the larger structure of the 
agency: “[I]n spite of the ALJ's complete independence of decision, 
he/she is a part of and is under the administrative direction and 
control of his employing agency.”97 
In a January 31, 1997, memorandum on SSA hearings titled 
Legal Foundations of the Duty of Impartiality in the Hearing Process 
and its Applicability to Administrative Law Judges, then-General 
Counsel Arthur Fried wrote: 
 
                                                 
examiners, would be a substantial drain on the trust fund and on the energy of 
physicians already in short supply.”). 
94 A September 2007 report by SSA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) shows 
that in fiscal year 2006, 439,000 of the 559,000 claims heard by administrative law 
judges were represented by attorney and nonattorney representatives, representing 
claimants in almost 80% of all claims appealed. Examined another way, the OIG 
notes, “[i]n FY 2006, approximately 26,000 attorneys and 5,000 non-attorneys 
represented claimants before ODAR.” Office of Inspector Gen., Soc. Sec. Admin., 
A-12-07-17057, Claimant Representatives Barred From Practicing Before the 
Social Security Administration 1 (2007), 
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-12-07-17057.pdf. 
95 Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110-11 (2000) (explaining that SSA's 
adjudication system has replaced the normal adversary procedure with an 
investigatory model resulting in inquisitorial proceedings). 
96 See 5 U.S.C. §§556-557 (2006); see also supra Part I.A (discussing the 
agency intervention and political agenda as hindering the administrative law judges 
from executing their duty). 
97 See Wolfe, supra note 41, at 225 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Memorandum from the Division of Policy and Procedure to the Director, BHA 
(Dec. 12, 1977) (on file with Author)). 
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SSA's and the claimant's ability to benefit from the 
highest quality and most efficient service of the ALJ 
corps is undermined by the differing and often 
contradictory understanding in various parts of the 
Agency of . . . “decisional independence.” This 
confusion exists about both the meaning of 
“decisional independence,” and the extent to which 
such independence limits the otherwise appropriate 
authority of the Agency to manage the performance of 
the ALJ corps.98 
 
General Counsel Fried thus framed it this way: 
 
[T]o what extent may SSA manage the 
performance of the ALJ corps?  Inherent in the 
concept of “management” is “control.” During the 
1980s, SSA “attempted to exercise control” over ALJs 
in three respects: (1) it demanded greater ALJ 
productivity, (2) it demanded greater consistency in 
ALJ decision making, and (3) it altered the 
“proportion of cases in which they granted or denied 
benefits.”99 
 
The agency focus on control over administrative law judges 
stands in stark contrast to the CJRA and the efforts of the federal 
courts to endow judges with broader case and pretrial management 
authority. Dean and Professor of Law Victor Rosenblum described 
the January 1997 memorandum as “[a] prototype of myopic 
perception” of administrative law judges and their duties and further 
explains that his purpose in writing is “to examine the 
dysfunctionality of the General Counsel's narrow conception of 
                                                 
98 Id. at 205-06 (quoting Memorandum from the Division of Policy and 
Procedure to the Director, BHA (Dec. 12, 1977) (on file with Author)). 
99 Id. at 206 (quoting Richard J. Pierce, Political Control Versus Impermissible 
Bias In Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 481, 483 (1990)). 
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impartiality in his memorandum.”100 
The issue of judicial independence and a correspondingly 
expanded case management role for judges has not beem limited to 
SSA.  Similar issues have plagued administrative adjudications 
within the Department of Agriculture. 
 
It is common knowledge that an absolute 
necessary element for the existence of an impartial 
adjudicator is judicial independence.  However, it is of 
great concern to all of us who believe in the idea of 
impartiality and fairness that this necessary element of 
judicial independence is under such intense 
attack.  The attacks emanating from those within the 
leadership roles of the administrative bureaucracies 
include the agencies' leaders and the government 
attorneys (Offices of the General Counsel) in the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and [SSA].101 
 
This restrictive view of the role of administrative law judges 
within the agency is evident in its earlier actions.  While Congress 
and the federal courts were struggling to combat increasing delay and 
rising costs in a perceived effort to keep the courthouse doors open in 
1989, the agency was withdrawing resources from its administrative 
law judges.  In a 1989 Report to the Subcommittee on Social Security 
of the House Ways and Means Committee, the GAO noted various 
actions to restrain administrative law judges, including the 
withdrawal of individual staff and administrative support, placing 
staff persons in a shared pool, and, to make matters worse, no longer 
serving under the direction of individual judges: 
 
OHA began “pooling” resources within some 
hearing offices as a demonstration project in the late 
1970s, and expanded it to additional hearing offices in 
the early 1980s. Under pooling, ALJs do not have 
                                                 
100 Victor G. Rosenblum, Toward Heightening Impartiality in Social Security 
Agency Proceedings Involving Administrative Law Judges, 18 J. NAT'L ASS'N 
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 58, 58 (1998). 
101 Wendell Fennell & Fred Young, Judicial Independence Under Siege, 17 J. 
NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 211, 211 (1997) (emphasis omitted). 
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direct control over their support staff. Some or all 
support staff previously assigned to individual ALJs 
are now placed in a common staff pool. OHA began 
pooling staff to improve efficiency and balance staff 
workload. 
GAO asked ALJs for their views on the pooling of 
decision writers and staff attorneys in their 
offices.  About two-thirds of the ALJs who responded 
said such a reconfiguration had a negative effect on 
hearing office operations.102 
 
While the GAO study documented a perceived loss of resources 
within the administrative law judge community, “many of the 
managers GAO spoke with said that staff pooling provided more 
flexibility in using staff and allowed a more balanced workload for 
all staff.”103  The question becomes whether the net effect of this and 
similar actions effectively places the proverbial cart before the horse. 
In a 2006 Social Security Advisory Board report, staffing issues 
similar to those raised in 1989 were again questioned: 
 
In discussing these figures on ALJ decisions, we 
do not mean to imply that only ALJs have an impact 
on the number of decisions.  ALJs are only a part, 
albeit a very important part, of the hearing 
process.  They are dependent on others to prepare 
cases for hearing and to write decisions after the 
hearings.  They need staff in those positions in 
sufficient quantity and quality. 
In fact, many ALJs and management officials have 
told us that their most urgent need is support staff 
rather than additional ALJs.  We have heard that the 
type of support staff needed varies from office to 
office.  In some offices there is a shortage of case 
technicians to prepare cases for hearing.  In others, a 
                                                 
102 U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO HRD-90-15, Many Administrative 
Law Judges Oppose Productivity Measures 4 (1989) [hereinafter GAO HRD-90-
15, Productivity Measures]. 
103 Id. 
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lack of decision writers creates a bottleneck.  In 2005, 
the median office had between 4 and 4.5 staff 
members (decision writers, case technicians, and other 
support staff, excluding those designated as 
management).  This is fewer than the peak in 2001 of 
5.4 staff members per judge.  Our analysis of the data 
from 2002 through 2005 shows that, as staff-to-judge 
ratios increase, dispositions per judge also tend to 
increase and average processing time tends to 
decline.104 
 
The GAO study recounts a long history of tension between the 
agency and its judges, highlighting the continuing debate over the 
manner of judicial functioning: 
 
Conflicts between OHA management and ALJs 
have existed for at least a decade. Some issues that 
divided management and ALJs in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s are still argued today.  For example, in 
June 1977, five ALJs filed a lawsuit alleging that 
SSA's use of numerical production goals and related 
matters violated the APA and the Fifth Amendment to 
the Constitution.  This case was settled in June 1979, 
in what is commonly referred to as the “Bono 
agreement,” in which SSA and the five ALJs agreed to 
certain policy and practice changes. 
In the early 1980s, another disagreement arose 
over criteria OHA management used in selecting ALJ 
decisions for review. Commonly known as Bellmon 
reviews, OHA management selected cases for review 
based on a judge's high allowance rates. ALJs 
disagreed with the selection process, claiming 
interference with their decisional independence. In 
1983, the Association of Administrative Law Judges, 
which represents about 50 percent of SSA's ALJs, 
filed suit seeking an injunction against targeted 
Bellmon reviews. On June 21, 1984, before the court 
                                                 
104 Soc. Sec. Advisory Bd., supra note 40, at 14. 
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ruled on the suit, OHA rescinded the policy of 
targeting for review ALJs who had high allowance 
rates.105 
 
Herein, perhaps, lies the genesis of much of the current debate 
between the agency and the administrative judiciary.  Judges have, in 
recent times, reversed agency administrative decisions at a greater 
rate than they have affirmed such determinations.  In significant part, 
this is because a claimant's condition worsens over time.  Other 
factors include the fact that claimants are now overwhelmingly 
represented at a hearing; such proceedings usually embrace the first 
face-to-face encounter between the claimant and a decisionmaker, all 
previous decisions having been a paper or “file review.” 
Decisions by administrative law judges, then, invoke the human 
factor—largely unaccounted for by the agency in earlier 
administrative denials.  In effect, the judge is reversing the earlier 
agency determination, resulting in a statistically greater frequency of 
“paying cases” than at lower administrative levels. Judicial decisions 
thus cost the agency, whose budget must then account for the greater 
number of pay cases than originally contemplated. As the GAO noted 
in 2002 in assessing “five initiatives to improve SSA's disability 
claims process”: 
 
[A]ccording to SSA, more denied claimants would 
appeal to ALJs under the Prototype [hearing process] 
than under the traditional process.  More appeals 
would result in additional claimants waiting 
significantly longer for final agency decisions on their 
claims, and would increase workload pressures on 
SSA hearings offices, which are already experiencing 
considerable case backlogs. It would also result in 
higher administrative costs under the Prototype than 
under the traditional process.  More appeals would 
also result in more awards from ALJs and overall and 
higher benefit costs under the Prototype than under the 
                                                 
105 GAO HRD-90-15, Productivity Measures, supra note 102, at 12 (footnotes 
omitted). 
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traditional process.106 
 
High reversal rates by judges of agency disability determinations 
have led the agency to conclude that there is (or must be) a 
correspondingly high error rate among such decisions, in turn leading 
the agency to exert greater control over the claims 
process.  Evidently, the agency assumes its administrative 
determinations are more likely to be correct than the judicial 
decisions of its judges. These issues came to the fore, as noted 
earlier,107  with the initiation of the so-called Bellmon review (named 
after legislation sponsored by then-U.S. Senator Henry Bellmon of 
Oklahoma)--a program that contemplated heightened review of 
administrative law judge-issued “favorable” decisions.108  A 1989 
GAO report summarizes the intensified scrutiny of such decisions: 
 
Based partly on the results of a 1981 study of 
3,600 ALJ decisions, which concluded among other 
things that there was a higher probability of error in 
favorable decisions of those ALJs with high overall 
allowance rates, SSA decided to implement the 
amendment by directing its Bellmon reviews at those 
ALJs with allowance rates of 70 percent or 
higher.  Entire hearing offices were targeted if their 
collective allowance rate was 74 percent or 
higher.  Targeted ALJs were required to forward all 
favorable decisions (allowances) to the Appeals 
Council for review before their effectuation or 
finalization. . . .  ALJs whose decisions were often 
objected to were to be given counseling, retraining, 
and eventually subjected to “disciplinary or remedial” 
measures. By 1983, OHA was using the own-motion 
rates (analyst referrals to the Appeals Council) to 
decide which ALJs would be targeted for review.109 
 
                                                 
106 See, e.g., GAO-02-322, Disappointing Results, supra note 56, at 3. 
107 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
108 See GAO/HRD-89-48BR, Required Reviews, supra note 46, at 1. 
109 Id. at 8. 
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In effect, the agency determined to “discipline” or remediate (in 
some cases, “retrain”) judges.110  This resulted in federal litigation in 
1983, which revealed, among other things, that the “Associate 
Commissioner for Hearings and Appeals had a performance goal in 
his Senior Executive Service contract to reduce ALJ allowance 
rates.”111 
Critically, the court found: 
 
With reason, plaintiff and its members viewed 
defendants' combined actions as a message to ALJs to 
tip the balance against claimants in close cases to 
avoid reversal or remand by the Appeals Council, 
which would increase their own motion rate, which 
would result in being placed on Bellmon Review, with 
the added potential for peer counseling and [Merit 
Systems Protection Board] proceedings.112 
 
The clear agency perception was that the collective error in 
decisionmaking was by judges and not the underlying policies or 
initiatives of its administrators.  In effect, the agency ascribed error to 
judicial decisionmaking, looking to its own analysts as a baseline 
against which administrative law judge decisionmaking was 
measured. Thus, agency initiatives since that time specifically 
address the question of “inconsistencies” between the underlying 
administrative decisionmakers and the judges113 and have sought to 
rectify the issue through more benign methods, including “process 
unification.” As pointed out in a 2004 GAO study, however, the 
assessment of inconsistency is itself subject to question: 
                                                 
110 See Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1137-
38 (D.D.C. 1984). 
111 GAO/HRD-89-48BR, Required Reviews, supra note 46, at 8. 
112 Heckler, 594 F. Supp. at 1139. 
113 See Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/T-HEHS-95-233, Social Security 
Disability: Management Action and Program Redesign Needed to Address Long-
Standing Problems 1 (1995) (statement of Jane L. Ross, Director, Income Security 
Issues, Health, Education, and Human Services Division: “In summary, our work 
shows that SSA has serious problems managing the disability programs on several 
separate but related fronts. First, the lengthy and complicated decision-making 
process results in untimely decisions, especially for those who appeal, and shows 
troubling signs of inconsistency, which compromise the integrity of the process.”). 
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SSA's assessments have not provided a clear 
understanding of the extent and causes of possible 
inconsistencies in decisions between adjudication 
levels.  The two measures SSA uses to monitor 
inconsistency of decisions have weaknesses, such as 
not accounting for the many factors that can affect 
decision outcomes, and therefore do not provide a true 
picture of the changes in consistency.  Furthermore, 
SSA has not sufficiently assessed the causes of 
possible inconsistency.  For example, SSA conducted 
an analysis in 1994 that identified potential areas of 
inconsistency, but it did not employ more 
sophisticated techniques--such as multivariate 
analyses, followed by in-depth case studies--that 
would allow the agency to identify and address the 
key areas and leading causes of possible 
inconsistency.  SSA has yet to repeat or expand upon 
this 10-year-old study.114 
 
More than any other indicator, this illustrates the inapposite 
worldviews represented by the nonjudicial and judicial actors in the 
system.  Even the Social Security Advisory Board (SSAB), a 
bipartisan Presidential advisory panel,115 has seen a need to call for a 
restoration of the relationship between the agency and its 
administrative law judges, pointing to a “residue of mistrust that goes 
back at least as far as the late 1970s, when pressures to reduce the 
number of allowances and increase the number of decisions led to a 
situation that was described as ‘an agency at war with itself.”’116  The 
2006 SSAB Report urges the agency and its judges to work with one 
another, recognizing the inherent and long-standing differing views 
of each. 
                                                 
114 U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-04-656, More Effort Needed to 
Assess Consistency of Disability Decisions, at Highlights (2004). 
115 See About the Board--Authorizing Statute, Soc. Sec. Advisory Bd., 
http://www.ssab.gov/AbouttheBoard/AuthorizingStatute.aspx (last visited May 14, 
2012) (discussing the creation of the a seven-member bipartisan Social Security 
Advisory Board along with the establishment of SSA as an independent agency). 
116 Soc. Sec. Advisory Bd., supra note 40, at 15. 
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The agency's operational milieu, as evidenced by repeated agency 
action which excludes the administrative judiciary from 
policymaking, ignores the inherent expertise and experience the 
judges bring to the unique field of judicial case management.117  This 
is most clearly seen in the recent February 8, 2008, Office of 
Inspector General Audit Report (2008 Report) titled Administrative 
Law Judges' Caseload Performance.118  Instead of focusing on 
creative potential within the existing regulatory scheme by which 
administrative law judges may assume an expanded judicial role, 
bringing to bear their talents, training, and experience in a wider case 
management role, the 2008 Report, like the 1997 Office of General 
Counsel (OGC) Memorandum, ignores the call of the SSAB for 
reconciliation and seeks to reinforce the idea that judges may be held 
accountable for even greater productivity standards. 
                                                 
117 One noted commentator writes: 
 
The term “federal administrative judiciary” is not frequently 
used, but it highlights the relationship between the administrative 
decision system and the federal judiciary. Administrative 
deciders are significant participants in our constitutional 
scheme.... 
Administrative Law Judges as a group are among the most 
diversely talented, well-trained, and deeply entrenched 
adjudicators in our system, even when they are compared with 
the federal district and state judiciary.  There are almost 1,200 
ALJs who are assigned to 30 federal agencies.  This is 
approximately equivalent to the number of judges on the federal 
trial bench . . . . 
. . . . 
A survey concludes...in education, training and experience, 
they seem no less qualified than bankruptcy judges and 
magistrates, if not members of the federal bench . . . . They enjoy 
a more secure tenure and compensation than do bankruptcy 
judges or magistrates because they do not serve terms.  Rather, 
they effectively receive life tenure subject to removal for good 
cause . . . . These protections provide ALJs with a certain degree 
of judicial independence. 
 
Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections Upon the Federal Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA 
L. REV. 1341, 1343-45 (1992). 
118 See Office of the Inspector Gen., Soc. Sec. Admin., A-07-07-17072, 
Administrative Law Judges' Caseload Performance 3-4 (2008) [hereinafter OIG 
Report], http://www.ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/A-07-07-17072.pdf. 
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The 2008 Report, like its 1997 OGC counterpart, appears to 
challenge the scope of judicial independence arguing that its 
protections be subordinated to the demands of production.  “Federal 
legislation,” it states, “does not prevent SSA from establishing a 
performance accountability process wherein ALJs are held to 
reasonable production goals, as long as the goals do not infringe on 
ALJs' qualified decisional independence.”119  In making this 
assertion, the 2008 Report cites, among other authorities, Nash v. 
Bowen.120  The Nash court explained: 
 
The setting of reasonable production goals, as 
opposed to fixed quotas, is not in itself a violation of 
the APA.  The district court explicitly found that the 
numbers at issue constituted reasonable goals as 
opposed to unreasonable quotas.  Judge Elfvin 
explained that 
 
[a] minimum number of dispositions an ALJ 
must decide in a given period, provided this 
number is reasonable and not “etched in 
stone”, is not a prescription of how, or how 
quickly, an ALJ should decide a particular 
case. It does not dictate the content of the 
decision.121 
 
The 2008 Report calls for “performance accountability 
procedures” to be established, examining through the course of the 
Report various “what if” scenarios (projecting the resulting backlog 
reduction if individual judges decided 400, 450, 500, or 550 cases per 
year).122  The 2008 Report concludes that backlog reduction can be 
achieved by simply imposing a goal and demanding (under penalty of 
accountability procedures) that judges meet the goal, with no other 
changes to case management procedures or processes through which 
expanded and creative judicial management methods can be brought 
                                                 
119 Id. at 4. 
120 869 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989). 
121 Id. at 680-81 (alteration in original). 
122 OIG Report, supra note 118, at 6. 
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to bear during the life of the case. In this, it evokes the earlier 
Bellmon review and ignores the Bono Settlement Agreement of 
1979.123  The 2008 Report typifies the agency's cultural stance, 
looking at judges not as a valued repository of expertise but as 
extensions of bureaucratic will—demanding they do more, but 
confining such further activity to a narrow band of crystallized action 
and banning heightened case management authority. 
The 2008 Report contemplates continuing a jurisprudence 
founded on the same model as has stood for multiple decades.  It fails 
to embrace the SSAB call for collaboration generally and makes no 
proposals to encourage a collaborative effort to resolve caseload 
management and the backlog specifically.  Instead, it mirrors that 
which has been.  The agency--regardless of the efficacy of its 
underlying position with respect to goals and productivity--continues 
a seeming adversarial stance with its judges, isolating the judges in 
an ever-narrowing and circumscribed decisionmaking window, 
effectively the reciprocal course taken by Congress and the federal 
courts.124 
 
IV. CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN A NEW VENUE? 
 One alternative previously unaddressed in this Article is 
whether there should even be a push for an expanded case 
management role for administrative law judges within SSA.  Some 
argue that the ideal solution is a change of venue--the creation of an 
independent corps of administrative law judges which would, by 
definition not be subject to the bureaucratic stricture of any given 
agency, but which would nevertheless have responsibility for 
independent adjudication of all administrative appeals currently 
heard by administrative law judges across executive branch agencies. 
This view finds support in an unexpected manner.  While many 
have debated the continuing role of the federal administrative 
judiciary within the Executive Branch, arguments that urge a 
separation of administrative law judges from their respective 
                                                 
123 See Bono, supra note 34. 
124 See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1038 (Fredrick C. Mish et al. 
eds., 11th ed. 2008) (providing the definition of reciprocal and, through inference, 
explaining that in nautical terms a reciprocal course is 180 degrees in the other 
(opposite) direction). 
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agencies, and that have at their core supposed threats to the integrity 
of the administrative decisionmaking process, have not won the 
day.  Over time, the issues have come to center not so much on the 
question of integrity of the decisionmaking process but on effective 
functioning.  A brief overview of the various arguments highlights 
this distinction. 
A 1985 article in the ABA Journal titled Breaking Away: 
Administrative Law Judges Seek Freer Status recounts the 
introduction of legislation some twenty-five years ago whose purpose 
was “to consolidate federal administrative law judges into an 
independent corps.”125  The arguments then centered on the 
appearance of bias as well as undue influence: “Advocates of the 
corps concept say it would eliminate an appearance of bias that exists 
because judges work for agencies whose cases they hear . . . .”126 
One writer points out that it is the need “to protect the integrity, 
independence and impartiality of administrative law judges”127  that 
fuels the call for reform in federal administrative adjudication.  The 
Honorable Charles N. Bono, then an administrative law judge at SSA 
who chaired the ABA National Conference of Administrative Law 
Judges in 1992, explained that “[t]he tension between an agency's 
administrators and its ALJs is magnified by the fact that the 
employing agency has an agenda that may conflict with the judges' 
responsibility to provide parties with due process.”128  Judge Bono 
further clarified his point in testimony in an April 29, 1992 hearing of 
the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Law and 
Governmental Relations: “ALJs have been subjected to monthly 
performance targets set by agencies; rankings, ratings and 
evaluations of individual performances; and threats of removal, 
reprimand or deprivation of staff and equipment if targets are not 
met.”129 
Those opposed to this view argue that this is a nonissue, as 
                                                 
125 Faye A. Silas, Breaking Away: Administrative Law Judges Seek Freer 
Status, A.B.A. J., July 1985, at 18. 
126 Id. 
127 McMillion, supra note 31, at 103. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
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evidence of bias has not been raised.130  Note, however, the plaintiff's 
argument in Richardson v. Perales in 1971, raising essentially this 
very argument: 
 
Finally, the claimant complains of the system of 
processing disability claims.  He suggests, and is 
joined in this by the briefs of amici, that the 
Administrative Procedure Act, rather than the Social 
Security Act, governs the processing of claims and 
specifically provides for cross-examination.  The 
claimant goes on to assert that in any event the hearing 
procedure is invalid on due process grounds.  He says 
that the hearing examiner has the responsibility for 
gathering the evidence and “to make the Government's 
case as strong as possible”; that naturally he leans 
toward a decision in favor of the evidence he has 
gathered; that justice must satisfy the appearance of 
justice; and that an “independent hearing examiner 
such as in the” Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act should be provided.131--an 
argument the Supreme Court then rejected: 
 
Neither are we persuaded by the advocate-
judge-multiple-hat suggestion.  It assumes too 
much and would bring down too many 
procedures designed, and working well, for a 
governmental structure of great and growing 
complexity.  The social security hearing 
examiner, furthermore, does not act as 
counsel.  He acts as an examiner charged with 
developing the facts.132 
 
The Author questioned, in an earlier writing, “Would the court 
today hold that delays in decisionmaking of between one and two 
years violate fundamental due process, if not the public policy 
                                                 
130 Id. 
131 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 408-09 (1971) (citations omitted). 
132 Id. at 410. 
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underlying these benefits? Would it look to the ‘governmental 
structure of great and growing complexity’ of 2010 and still declare 
that it is ‘working well?”’133 
In a more temperate assessment, the difference between a judge 
sitting in a court of law and an administrative law judge in the 
Executive Branch is described as not so much a difference in 
functioning, as both must strive for impartiality, but as a question of 
constitutional structure: 
 
The instinctive defensive reaction to a claim that 
the administrative adjudicator is controlled by the 
agency she serves may be to raise the vigorous 
assertion that due process requires the ALJ be 
independent of the agency she serves. The distinctions 
between judges of the judicial branch and those of the 
executive branch are such, however, as to call into 
question such a conclusion. At the outset, it is 
important to note the distinctions that courts have 
already made that set apart the executive judiciary 
from the judicial branch adjudicators: that 
“[a]dministrative decisionmakers do not bear all the 
badges of independence that characterize an Article III 
judge, but they are held to the same standard of 
impartial decisionmaking.” Though it may be 
appealing for ALJs to believe they must operate 
independent of their agency, constitutional 
jurisprudence does not support a claim that due 
process mandates such independence. Rather, if we 
conclude that as ALJs we must “avoid, and should be 
shielded as much as possible from, any influences that 
might in any way compromise such independence, 
neutrality, and impartiality,” as Judge Young has 
recommended, we must find bases for this mandate 
other than those found in the Due Process Clause of 
                                                 
133 Jeffrey S. Wolfe, The Times They Are a Changin': A New Jurisprudence 
for Social Security, 29 J. NAT'L ASSN. OF ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 515, 543-44 (2009) 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Richardson, 402 U.S. at 410). 
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the Constitution.134 
 
Judge McNeil aptly points out “that by the 1930s the 
administrative court was entrenched and expanding, sharing much of 
the same apparent authority as that possessed by article III courts, 
without the constitutional protection of life tenure and undiminished 
salary.”135  Administrative decisionmaking was ratified by the 
Supreme Court in Crowell v. Benson: 
 
[The case] assumed that public rights disputes may 
not require a judicial decision at either the original or 
appellate levels.  Even in private rights cases, Crowell 
held, an administrative tribunal may make findings of 
fact and render an initial decision of legal and 
constitutional questions, as long as there is an 
adequate review available in a constitutional court.136 
 
Critically, however, Judge McNeil notes that the inherent 
relationship between the administrative law judge and the agency 
within which he or she sits is a creature of the APA. 
 
The ALJ serves an executive function not shared 
by the article III judge: her authority is no greater than 
that of the agency she serves, and as an adjudicator 
she is charged with an affirmative ethical obligation to 
perform judicial or quasi-judicial tasks in the context 
of the executive agency's mandate, not independent of 
that agency, for she has no authority independent of 
that agency.137 
                                                 
134 Christopher B. McNeil, Similarities and Differences Between Judges in the 
Judicial Branch and the Executive Branch: The Further Evolution of Executive 
Adjudications Under the Administrative Central Panel, 18 J. NAT'L ASS'N OF 
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 6-7 (1998) (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). 
135 Id. at 14. 
136 Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphases omitted) (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 
U.S. 22, 51-65 (1932)). 
137 Id. at 35; see also James E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary's 
Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1191, 1192 (2006) (drawing the 
distinction between independence and impartiality, and noting that the 
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Against this backdrop, the question arises whether it is now time 
for SSA's administrative law judges to migrate to a separate 
adjudicative agency, or even to an Article I court similar to that of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. 
In examining the question, the issue is not whether there is a need 
for such action based on arguments of threats to the integrity of 
administrative law judge decisionmaking, agency influence, or the 
appearance of bias, but rather whether the agency, as a politically 
animated entity tasked with responsibility for such decisionmaking, 
has effectively forfeited its responsibility by virtue of continued 
ineffective action in dealing with the problem.  More to the point, has 
the agency, by virtue of its continued animus in its relationship with 
its administrative law judges, made a migration of this corps of 
administrative decisionmakers a virtual necessity such that to do 
anything less would result in the continuity of the pending backlog? 
The answer to these questions lies in both a historical as well as 
functional view of the agency and its conduct.  Repeated actions 
since the mid-1970s have signaled agency intention to more closely 
manage administrative decisionmaking.  As such, the issues are not 
new.  In a 1991 article in the Notre Dame Law Review, Professor 
Daniel Gifford writes: 
 
The focus of these debates has been the 
relationship between the Department's Social Security 
Administration and the administrative law judges, and, 
in particular, the extent to which the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services may legitimately attempt 
to influence the ways in which the administrative law 
judges work. 
The SSA has justified its management initiatives 
as designed to improve the quality and efficiency of 
the social security program.  They are designed, it is 
said, to foster efficient disposition of caseloads, to 
reduce inconsistency in results, and to hold back the 
dramatic increases in cost which have afflicted the 
                                                 
administrative judges are no less judges, but are not independent as are judges in 
the Judicial Branch and are nevertheless required to be impartial in presiding over 
hearings). 
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program in recent years.  Many administrative law 
judges, however, have viewed these supervisory 
initiatives from the Secretary as intrusions upon their 
independence which they have challenged in the 
courts.  Disability claimants have also been quick to 
assert that these management efforts have interfered 
with their right to an impartial decision.138 
 
A crucial failing, in Professor Gifford's view, has been the failure 
by the agency to promulgate precise procedural rules and thereby 
attain greater consistency in adjudicative decisionmaking: 
 
But the SSA has been unable or unwilling to 
formulate other policies with sufficient clarity and 
comprehensiveness to reduce the disparity among the 
way ALJs decide cases.  In the absence of precise and 
binding rules, the SSA has resorted to quality control 
programs and other management techniques.  This 
novel approach to mass adjudication has forced a new 
and more precise examination of the extent to which 
management techniques can properly be classified as 
part of the policy control which belongs to the 
agency.139 
 
This inaction has continued to the present.  No comprehensive 
formal rules of procedure for disability hearings exist, and indeed, 
repeated calls by administrative law judges to enact rules that would 
at least close the record after a hearing have fallen on deaf ears.  Even 
today, post-hearing, a claimant can discover new evidence and 
submit it as part of an appeal with the administrative law judge never 
having seen the documents.  As Professor Gifford points out, “It is 
difficult for the SSA to complain of inconsistent decisionmaking by 
administrative law judges and yet fail to promulgate corrective rules. 
If ALJ decisions are heavily inconsistent, then large numbers of them 
are apparently wrong.”140  Arguably, then, if large numbers are 
                                                 
138 Gifford, supra note 45, at 1010. 
139 Id. at 1011. 
140 Id. at 1016-17. 
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wrong, why has the agency been reluctant to implement rules of 
procedure designed to streamline and facilitate the decisional 
process, effectively akin to those adopted by the Judicial Branch 
when it faced a similar impending crisis of cost and delay? Professor 
Gifford further observes: 
 
[I]f the SSA can conclude that administrative law 
judges inconsistently decide similar cases, the SSA 
may be able to reduce the issues to written form and 
provide for the resolution of those issues by rule.  In 
short, the very ability of the SSA to identify 
inconsistencies in ALJ decisionmaking suggests that 
those inconsistencies could be reduced through 
increased rulemaking.141 
 
In the years since Professor Gifford's writings, the agency has 
continued to employ “quality control programs and other 
management techniques.”142  It has done so despite repeated audits 
by the GAO demonstrating that SSA's “techniques” have not worked, 
and continues in this path to the present time. In Professor Gifford's 
words, “This novel approach to mass adjudication has forced a new 
and more precise examination of the extent to which management 
techniques can properly be classified as part of the policy control 
which belongs to the agency.”143 
In 2003 the Honorable Robin Arzt, serving as an administrative 
law judge with the SSA, in a comprehensive analytical writing, 
proposed what is virtually a blueprint for a new, separate 
adjudicatory agency to hear and decide Social Security disability 
appeals.  She terms this agency the “United States Office of Hearings 
and Appeals (USOHA).”144  She proposed an adjudicatory agency 
having 
 
                                                 
141 Id. at 1017. 
142 Id. at 1011. 
143 Id. 
144 Robin J. Arzt, Recommendations for a New Independent Adjudication 
Agency to Make the Final Administrative Adjudications of Social Security Act 
Benefits Claims, 23 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 267, 269 (2003) (internal 
quotations marks omitted). 
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exclusive jurisdiction to make the final administrative 
decisions of Social Security Act Titles II, XVI and 
XVIII benefits claims.  The USOHA would have 
permissive jurisdiction over other classes of cases, so 
it may hear and decide other classes of cases such as 
those that the SSA ALJs have heard in the past.  The 
final administrative adjudication authority of SSA and 
[the Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS)] would be abolished, including the SSA 
Appeals Council and DHHS Medicare Appeals 
Council.145 
 
Judge Arzt also proposed: 
 
An individual ALJ's decision would be appealed to 
appellate panel staffed by ALJs, which would consist 
of three ALJs who would review the cases 
locally.  The ALJ appellate panels would be akin to 
the United States Bankruptcy Court appellate panels. . 
. . 
The final decisions of the USOHA would be 
appealable only to the federal courts, with the District 
Courts as the first step in the judicial review.146 
 
Notably, Judge Arzt proposes agency independence through 
appointment of a “Chief Administrative Law Judge . . . by the 
President from the ranks of the ALJs.”147  A critical hallmark of such 
an independent adjudicatory agency is the ability of such a body to 
do what the agency has not to this point been able to accomplish: 
“The USOHA would set its own rules of practice and procedure and 
the ALJs would administer the agency.”148  She argues the need for 
such an independent agency as predicated on a recognized need for 
effective adjudicatory functioning free from political or policy 
concerns-- issues that now plague the agency: 
                                                 
145 Id. at 274. 
146 Id. at 274-75. 
147 Id. at 275. 
148 Id. 
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There is an inherent, and often real, conflict 
between (1) the need for independent and impartial 
appellate administrative decisionmakers and 
decisions, and (2) Executive Branch agency 
policymakers' desire to control the decisionmakers and 
the outcome of their decisions to conform to policy 
and political concerns. This conflict results in agency 
policymakers' intrusions into the administrative 
adjudication function. 
Many of the same rationales that justify Congress' 
creation of specialized independent Article I courts to 
perform the initial judicial review of final 
administrative decisions by Executive Branch 
agencies also support the separation of the appellate 
administrative adjudication function from Executive 
Branch agencies.  This is done to promote decisional 
independence from the agencies' 
policymaking/rulemaking, prosecutorial/enforcement 
and investigatory functions.149 
 
Judge Arzt cites to other, similar legislation by Congress, 
including the establishment of the U.S. Tax Court, the Court of 
Appeals for Veterans Claims, as well as congressional action to 
create the Board of Tax Appeals “to provide an independent tribunal 
to hear taxpayers' appeals from tax deficiency notices before payment 
of the tax after a Congressionally created board studied the IRS 
appellate review practices.” That board concluded: 
 
[I]t would never be possible to give to the taxpayer 
the fair and independent review to which he is of right 
entitled as long as the appellate tribunal is directly 
under, and its recommendations subject to the 
approval of, the officer whose duty it is to administer 
the law and collect the tax.  As long as the appellate 
tribunal is part and parcel of the collecting machinery 
it can hardly maintain the attitude essential to a 
                                                 
149 Id. at 279. 
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judicial tribunal.150 
 
A similar rationale, she argues, applies here.  Furthermore, in a 
mass-justice system such as the Social Security disability appeals 
system, which literally decides hundreds of thousands of cases 
annually, the policymaking function often times served by 
administrative law judges through adjudicatory decisionmaking is 
absent.  Such absence effectively moots the need for continued 
agency oversight of the adjudicatory function, since no policymaking 
function is thereby served. 
 
[W]hen an agency no longer formulates policy 
through its adjudication function but does so only 
through rulemaking, which is the case for SSA and 
[DHHS Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services], 
supervision of the appellate administrative 
adjudicators and review of their decisions by policy-
making political appointees has no reason to 
continue.  At that point, there is no reason to keep the 
adjudicatory function within the agency.151 
 
Others agree, noting that “[i]n the benefit agencies, the efficient 
disposition of a large volume of benefit claims demands the use of 
relatively precise standards, whose applications do not raise 
significant policy issues.”152  Mass-justice systems such as SSA do 
not formulate policy through adjudicatory decisionmaking, rendering 
even more significant the agency's failure to implement 
comprehensive rules of hearing procedure: 
 
In a mass-justice agency, adjudication is unsuited 
for use as a vehicle for announcing or formulating 
policy.  The cases come too fast and in too great a 
volume for decisionmakers to look to other cases as 
guides; sorting out, distinguishing or following large 
                                                 
150 Id. at 279-80 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 68-103, at 4 
(1923)). 
151 Id. at 280-81. 
152 Gifford, supra note 45, at 997. 
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volumes of cases whose holdings are necessarily 
circumscribed by their unique factual configurations is 
impractical.  Thus, in a mass-justice agency, the 
agency head does not rely on adjudication to control 
policy and, accordingly, does not sit as a final 
adjudicator.  Moreover, the removal of the agency 
head from control of adjudication is fully consistent 
with the agency head's policy responsibility because 
no individual case is programmatically salient.  The 
agency head is not concerned with the disposition of 
any one case, but with the policies applied to large 
classes of cases.153 
 
The question is not an issue of judicial independence, for the 
administrative law judge is indeed a creature of the APA, which in 
turn defines the administrative law judge function as a derivative 
one.154  Rather, the question for the agency and for Congress is an 
issue of effective functioning--of carrying the congressional mandate 
embodied within the Social Security Act forward in a meaningfully 
timely manner. Judge Arzt critically notes that the proposed USOHA 
should properly be a part of the agency, but with direct lines of 
authority equivalent to the Commissioner with a presidentially 
appointed chief administrative law judge endowed with the ability to 
formulate rules of procedure necessary for effective adjudication.155  
The functional purpose of such an adjudicative agency is to free the 
administrative judiciary within the agency from the miasma of 
policies, programs, and initiatives that, having been repeatedly tried, 
have not succeeded in addressing a decades-long mounting backlog. 
Administrative law judges, tasked with the need to hear and 
decide can effectively construct and administer a system of hearings 
and appeals consistent with their professional worldview, experience, 
training, and expertise.  The ability to accomplish what, to date, the 
agency has failed to do--establish rules of procedure--would 
significantly enhance proactive case management by administrative 
law judges who, like their Article III brethren, could become 
                                                 
153 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
154 See generally Moliterno, supra note 137, at 1191. 
155 Arzt, supra note 144, at 274. 
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involved in a case from the outset of the appeal, furthering a far more 
timely resolution than currently exists.  Many case management 
techniques can be employed to enhance the decisionmaking process, 
even in the hybrid jurisprudence now framed as nonadversarial by 
existing agency regulation.156  Meaningful judicial case management 
requires no less. 
 
V. FROM HERE, WHERE? 
 The wheel has effectively turned full circle.  In 1989 the 
problem, as defined by SSA and recounted by the GAO, was a 
question of consistency between the judges and the agency.  The so-
called Bellmon review catapulted the agency and its administrative 
law judges into federal court with allegations by the agency of 
erroneous decisions on the part of the judges and claims by 
administrative law judges of infringement of judicial independence--
accompanied by an allegation that a Senior Executive Service bonus 
provision was tied to a reduction in administrative law judge 
“reversals.”157 
In 2012, the question asked by the agency is now not so 
concerned with consistency as it is with numbers.  How many 
decisions can an administrative law judge decide?  The 2008 Report 
references Commissioner Astrue's statement that judges have now 
been asked to decide between 500 and 700 cases annually.158  This is 
an increase in expectations that many judges have attempted to meet 
with varying degrees of success depending on staffing, scheduling, 
and accounting for the individual differences in complexity each case 
brings. Judges have further noted that a statistically significant 
number of cases have little to do with disability per se, being instead 
issues of overpayment, appeals on nonmedical entitlement issues 
(such as income and resources), and issues relating to retirement. 
While it would be a welcome end to say that a solution was 
reached and the agency and administrative law judges are working 
together in much the same fashion as did the courts with members of 
                                                 
156 20 C.F.R. §404.900(b) (2011). 
157 See GAO/HRD-89-48BR, Required Reviews, supra note 46. 
158 See OIG Report, supra note 118, at 6 n.29 (“SSA has asserted that ALJs 
should be able to process 500 to 700 cases annually,” according to Michael J. 
Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security). 
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the bar and Congress in implementing the CJRA, such has not been 
and is not now the case.  Instead, the manner in which the 
administrative law judge functions has remained almost unchanged, 
apart from the request for and production of increasing numbers of 
dispositions.  No broad-sweeping procedural changes have been 
implemented that would allow a judge to become involved in a case 
upon the filing of a Request for Hearing; nor, in fact, have any rules 
of procedure actually been enacted. 
Remarkably, with the difficulties illustrated by the Bellmon 
review and the long-standing debate over the meaning and scope of 
decisional independence, the administrative law judge remains at the 
center of the solution to the backlog crisis, though little has been 
done to enhance the judicial role or function in the hearings 
process.  The current configuration is, functionally, a counter-
evolutionary or retrograde step back from 1989, reflecting the 
removal of individual judicial staffing.  The current hearing office 
configuration also reflects changes following the Hearing Process 
Improvement initiative, with a further refinement of pooled staffing 
into administrative groups headed by a group supervisor, potentially 
further distancing the judge from support staff.  As the Figure below 
clearly shows, the administrative law judge has no direct supervision 
over support staff. 
Figure 1159  depicts the current hearing office configuration: 
 
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS 
POINT IS OMMITTED 
 
The hearings process is depicted by the GAO at Figure 2:160 
 
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS 
POINT IS OMMITTED 
 
The “hearings level” description in Figure 2 describes only three 
administrative law judge activities: 
                                                 
159 See id. at Appendix C. 
160 U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-08-1053, Additional Performance 
Measures and Better Cost Estimates Could Help Improve SSA's Efforts to 
Eliminate Its Hearings Backlog 6 (2009). 
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• Administrative law judge prehearing review; 
• Administrative law judge conduct of a hearing; and 
• Administrative law judge issuance of a decision (which may 
or may not be written by the issuing judge). 
 
No in-depth study has been conducted to mirror that called for by 
the CJRA, examining the hearings process and the procedures by 
which the administrative law judge functions.  No study has 
examined the potential role of the administrative law judge in 
nonadversarial versus adversarial jurisprudence; nor has any 
comparative study been undertaken to determine if additional benefit 
can be derived from assigning a case to a judge from the time it is 
filed--that is, from the time a request for hearing before an 
administrative law judge is made. 
The evident assumption in the ensuing silence is that the 
administrative law judge is only to hear and decide the case when it 
is before him or her for decision.  Thus, the only contemplated 
judicial activity prior to a hearing is to read (review) the case file 
once it is assigned for hearing.  Once a case is assigned to a judge, he 
or she may also indicate whether prehearing case development is 
necessary, either in the form of obtaining records or scheduling 
consultative examinations, or may, after a hearing, order such 
examinations. 
These activities occur within the narrow time frame, 
comparatively speaking, that by definition comes at the relative end 
of the life of the case once it is pending at ODAR.  Figure 3 
diagrammatically depicts the life of a case and the narrow role of the 
administrative law judge (the superimposed triangle) in that life. 
Figure 3: 
 
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL OMITTED 
 
The inverted cone in Figure 3 illustrates the narrow scope of 
judicial involvement at the end of the life of the case before ODAR--
and stands in contrast to a depiction of judicial involvement in a case 
before the federal courts, as shown in Figure 4: 
 
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL OMITTED 
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Failing to provide innovation and creativity in the conduct of the 
hearings process, when coupled with a reluctance to address even 
basic questions, such as closing the record to the post-hearing receipt 
of evidence, much less formulation of a comprehensive set of rules of 
procedure,161 reduces the mandate of greater productivity to a simple 
command to “pedal faster.” 
The agency's administrative judiciary is keenly aware of the 
backlog and of the human price paid for delay, and has endeavored to 
redress the situation with increasing case dispositions working within 
the existing infrastructure.  This is far from ideal.  Instead, there is, 
and has been, a continuing need for comprehensive reform of the 
scope and breadth as was undertaken by Congress with the passage 
of the CJRA.  The agency has been aware of and has been attempting 
to redress the backlog crisis since the late 1980s.  It has not 
succeeded.  Despite the expenditure of millions of dollars, no actions 
have been taken to empower the federal administrative judiciary to 
parallel the revolution in judicial management in the federal 
courts.  However, it stands undisputed that the agency's 
administrative adjudicatory system is the largest of its kind in the 
world. 
Standing as a gleaming example of a successful attack on the 
burden of cost and delay is the success of the CJRA.  It has been an 
effective mechanism for reduction of cost and delay in the federal 
courts.  Despite this, no hue and cry has been raised for SSA to 
implement the same unique innovation undertaken to avert spiraling 
cost and delay facing the federal courts in 1989.  The growing delay 
                                                 
161 Some arguments have been made by representatives or claimants' 
organizations that to “close the record” or develop enforceable rules of procedure 
would somehow harm claimants. In truth, are they not harmed to a greater extent 
having to wait? Given that more than 80% of all claimants are now represented by 
counsel who are by definition equipped to deal with the requirements of such rules, 
little actual harm can be foreseen. Instead, the absence of rules of procedure signal 
a lack of accountability for representatives and leave open a hearings process which 
can only benefit from innovative and creative procedural rules designed to 
accomplish here what the Civil Justice Reform Act and its progeny have done for 
the federal courts. Is it possible to decide a case without a full hearing? The answer 
is yes. Should we discuss whether a non-adversarial jurisprudence continues as the 
best course in light of overwhelming representation in today's system? The answer 
is yes. Should comprehensive rules of procedure be established to ensure a case is 
ready for hearing if a hearing is required? The answer, again, is yes. 
    
200        Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary          33-1 
and costs in the federal courts were of such magnitude as to cause 
then-Senator Biden to call for congressional action in the passage of 
the CJRA as necessary to “grant federal courts the requisite 
autonomy, resources, and direction to bring about systemic reform 
and to solve the mounting crisis of litigation costs and delays.”162 
More than business as usual is required to save the Nation's 
system of disability appeals. The inertia of past practices and 
documented animus must be overcome and creative measures 
employed in the framing of a renewed decisionmaking paradigm. 
Both the agency and its cadre of administrative law judges must 
embrace the call of the Social Security Advisory Board to change 
SSA's relationship with its administrative law judges from “one of 
confrontation to cooperation.”163  In the highest ideals of public 
service, to serve the American people, it is time to empower the 
federal administrative judiciary--talented, capable, highly motivated 
men and women, dedicated to public service--and allow them the 
same opportunity to employ equal, if not greater, measures of 
creativity and judicial innovation witnessed during the past twenty 
years in the federal courts. 
 
All this will not be finished in the first hundred 
days.  Nor will it be finished in the first thousand 
days, nor in the life of this administration, nor even 
perhaps in our lifetime on this planet.  But let us 
begin. 
 
–John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 
35th President (1961-1963).164 
 
 APPENDIX I: THROUGH THE EYES OF THE GAO—SUMMARY OF KEY 
GAO REPORTS 
Collected key GAO reports addressing the backlog of disability 
appeals cases reflect a growing caseload punctuated with repeated 
                                                 
162 Biden, supra note 1, at 1286. 
163 Soc. Sec. Advisory Bd., Charting the Future of Social Security's Disability 
Programs: The Need for Fundamental Change 19 (2001). 
164 Inaugural Address, 1 Pub. Papers 1, 2 (Jan. 20, 1961). 
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attempts by the agency to “plug the gap,” with little success. 
 
GAO Report 02-322 
 
A 2002 report characterizes the agency's actions as 
“disappointing,” examining four agency efforts that the GAO found 
had only limited or no success: 
SSA has implemented four of the five disability claims process 
initiatives either nationwide or within selected geographic 
locations.  As summarized below, the improvements realized through 
their implementation have, in general, been disappointing. 
 
• The Disability Claim Manager Initiative. This initiative was 
completed in June 2001. Results of the pilot test, which was done at 
36 locations in 15 states beginning in November 1999, were mixed; 
claims were processed faster and customer and employee satisfaction 
improved, but administrative costs were substantially higher. An SSA 
evaluation of the test concluded that the overall results were not 
compelling enough to warrant additional testing or implementation of 
the Disability Claim Manager at this time. 
 
• The Prototype. This initiative was implemented in 10 states in 
October 1999 and continues to operate only in these states. 
Preliminary results indicate that the Prototype is moving in the 
direction of meeting its objective of ensuring that legitimate claims 
are awarded as early in the process as possible. Compared with their 
non-Prototype counterparts, the DDSs [disability determination 
services] operating under the Prototype are awarding a higher 
percentage of claims at the initial decision level, while the overall 
accuracy of their decisions is comparable with the accuracy of 
decisions made under the traditional process. In addition, when DDSs 
operating under the Prototype deny claims, appeals reach a hearing 
office about 70 days faster than under the traditional process because 
the Prototype eliminates the reconsideration step in the appeals 
process.  However, according to SSA, more denied claimants would 
appeal to administrative law judges under the Prototype than under 
the traditional process.  More appeals would result in additional 
claimants waiting significantly longer for final agency decisions on 
their claims, and would increase workload pressures on SSA hearings 
offices, which are already experiencing considerable case backlogs. It 
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would also result in higher administrative costs under the Prototype 
than under the traditional process. More appeals would also result in 
more awards from administrative law judges and overall and higher 
benefit costs under the Prototype than under the traditional process. 
Because of this, SSA acknowledged in December 2001 that it would 
not extend the Prototype to additional states in its current form. 
During the next several months, SSA plans to reexamine the 
Prototype to determine what revisions are necessary to decrease 
overall processing time and to reduce its impact on costs before 
proceeding further. 
 
• The Hearings Process Improvement Initiative. This initiative 
was implemented nationwide in 2000. The initiative has not 
improved the timeliness of decisions on appeals; rather, it has slowed 
processing in hearings offices from 318 days to 336 days. As a result, 
the backlog of cases waiting to be processed has increased 
substantially and is rapidly approaching crisis levels. The initiative 
has suffered from problems associated with implementing large-scale 
changes too quickly without resolving known problems. SSA is 
currently studying the situation in hearing offices to determine what 
changes are needed. 
 
• The Appeals Council Process Improvement Initiative. This 
initiative was implemented in fiscal year 2000 and has resulted in 
some improvements. While it fell short of achieving its goals, the 
time required to process a case in the Appeals Council has been 
reduced by 11 days to 447 days and the backlog of cases pending 
review has been reduced from 144,500 (fiscal year 1999) to 95,400 
(fiscal year 2001). Larger improvements in processing times were 
limited by, among other things, automation problems and policy 
changes. 
 
• The Quality Assurance Initiative. SSA's original (1994) plan to 
redesign the disability claims process called for SSA to undertake a 
parallel effort to revamp its existing quality assurance system. 
However, because of considerable disagreement among internal and 
external stakeholders on how to accomplish this difficult objective, 
progress has been limited to a contractor's assessment of SSA's 
existing quality assurance practices. In March 2001, the contractor 
recommended that SSA adopt a broader vision of quality 
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management, which would entail a significant overhaul of SSA's 
existing system. SSA established a work group to respond to the 
contractor report, but no specific proposals have yet been submitted 
to the Commissioner for approval.165 
 
GAO Report 08-40 
 
In a December 2007 report, the GAO even assesses the agency 
with responsibility for making the situation worse: 
 
While backlogs in processing disability claims 
have plagued SSA for many years, several factors 
have contributed to their increase in the last decade 
including substantial growth in initial applications, 
staff losses, and management weaknesses. . . 
.  Finally, management weaknesses as evidenced by a 
number of initiatives that were not successfully 
implemented have limited SSA's ability to remedy the 
backlog. Several initiatives introduced by SSA in the 
last 10 years to improve processing times and 
eliminate backlogged claims have, because of their 
complexity and poor execution, actually added to the 
problem. For example, the “Hearings Process 
Improvement” initiative implemented in fiscal year 
2000 significantly increased the days it took to 
adjudicate a hearings claim and exacerbated the 
backlog after the agency had substantially reduced 
it.166 
 
The backlog has been present and growing for more than a 
quarter century.  Even the court in Nash v. Bowen couched its 
comments in light of the backlog, commenting: “Moreover, in view 
of the significant backlog of cases, it was not unreasonable to expect 
administrative law judges to perform at minimally acceptable levels 
of efficiency. Simple fairness to claimants awaiting benefits required 
                                                 
165 GAO-02-322, Disappointing Results, supra note 56, at 3-4. 
166 GAO-08-40, Better Planning, supra note 5, at 3-4. 
    





Though the hearings backlog is longstanding, the manner in 
which judges conduct hearings has not changed.  A 2004 GAO report 
echoes both the issues of increased cost and undue delay that were 
the subject of the CJRA, but to date have not been successfully 
addressed by the agency: 
 
SSA has experienced difficulty managing its 
complex disability determination process, and 
consequently faces problems in ensuring the 
timeliness, accuracy, and consistency of its disability 
decisions.  Although SSA has made some gains in the 
short term in improving the timeliness of its decisions, 
the Commissioner has noted that it still has “a long 
way to go.” Over the past 5 years, SSA has slightly 
reduced the average time it takes to obtain a decision 
on an initial claim from 105 days in fiscal year 1999 
to 97 days in fiscal year 2003, and significantly 
reduced the average time it takes the Appeals Council 
to consider an appeal of a hearing decision from 458 
to 294 days over the same period. However, the 
average time it takes to receive a decision at the 
hearings level has increased by almost a month over 
the same period, from 316 days to 344 days. 
According to SSA's strategic plan, these delays place a 
significant burden on applicants and their families and 
an enormous drain on agency resources. 
Lengthy processing times have contributed to a 
large number of pending claims at both the initial and 
hearings levels.  While the number of initial disability 
claims pending has risen more than 25 percent over 
the last 5 years, from about 458,000 in fiscal year 
1999 to about 582,000 in fiscal year 2003, the number 
of pending hearings has increased almost 90 percent 
                                                 
167 869 F.2d 675, 681 (1989). 
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over the same time period, from about 312,000 to over 
591,000.  Some cases that are in the queue for a 
decision have been pending for a long time.  For 
example, of the 499,000 cases pending in June 2002 at 
the hearings level, about 346,000 (69 percent) were 
over 120 days old, 167,000 (33 percent) were over 
270 days old, and 88,500 (18 percent) were over 365 
days old.168 
 
GAO Report GAO/T-HEHS-97-118 
 
A 1997 report summarizes the many earlier reports in a 
characteristically similar straightforward manner: “Despite SSA 
attempts to reduce the backlog through its [Short Term Disability 
Project Plan (STDP)] initiatives, the agency did not reach its goal of 
reducing this backlog to 375,000 by December 1996.”169 
In short, a long series of GAO reports and findings, when 
considered together with the various statements of agency officials, 
paints a frighteningly simple picture of repeated complex initiatives 
(e.g., STDP--short term disability project), process improvements 
(e.g., HPI--hearing process improvement), and a string of alternative 
decisionmakers (the adjudication officer, the senior attorney, the 
federal reviewing official, and similar denominations of nonjudicial 
personnel)—all to little or no avail, despite the expenditure of tens of 
millions of dollars.  And, while hindsight is twenty-twenty, the 
public, the agency, and members of Congress stand not now looking 
back over twenty-five years for the first time, but having done so 
with the eyes of many who have looked and seen similar views over 
many years.  The gaze of members of Congress, high ranking 
officials, and the tenure of multiple Commissioners have seen the 
problems, heard the testimony, and witnessed the result. 
Still, the backlog persists. 
 
                                                 
168 U.S. Gov't Accounting Office, GAO-02-552T, Social Security Disability: 
Commissioner Proposes Strategy To Improve The Claims Process, But Faces 
Implementation Challenges 3-4 (2004). 
169 U.S. Gov't Accounting Office, GAO/T-HEHS-97-118, Social Security 
Disability: SSA Actions To Reduce Backlogs And Achieve More Consistent 
Decisions Deserve High Priority 3 (1997). 
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APPENDIX II: TWENTY YEARS OF SELECTED GAO FINDINGS ON THE 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION BACKLOG (1989–2009) 
The Bellmon Review--GAO Letter to the Chairman of 
the Social Security Subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Ways and Means, Regarding 
Suggestions on Ways to Make the Social Security 
Appeals Process Less Burdensome 
 
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-HRD-89- 
48BR, Results of Required Reviews of Administrative Law Judge 
Decisions (1989), http:// archive.gao.gov/d25t7/139091.pdf. 
This article assesses the merits of the Bellmon Review.  It finds 
that while the reviews appear to be cost effective, they also delay the 
payment of benefits and, overall, do not appear to have much value. 
 
GAO Report to the Chairman of the Social Security 
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and 
Means 
 
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-HRD-90-15, 
Many Administrative Law Judges Oppose Productivity Initiatives 
(1989), http:// www.gao.gov/assets/150/148485.pdf. 
In a report that attempted to determine what caused the recent 
conflicts between OHA management and administrative law judges, 
GAO found that such conflicts centered around management's 
attempts to increase administrative law judges' production 
levels.  The study further found that the reduction in the number of 
administrative law judges was warranted for a four-year period 
because of a sharp drop-off in the number of appeals.  However, 
OHA should have rehired more ALJs when the number of appeals 




 GAO Testimony of Jane L. Ross, Director, Income 
Security Issues, Health, Education, and Human 
Services Division, Before the Social Security 
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and 
Means 
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Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/T-HEHS-95-
233, Social Security Disability: Management Action and Program 
Redesign Needed to Address Long-Standing Problems (1995), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/110/106213.pdf. 
In this testimony, Jane Ross addressed three areas of concern 
about SSA management: (1) “improving the timeliness and 
consistency of disability decisions”; (2) “helping more people reduce 
their dependence on cash benefits”; and (3) “ensuring that benefits 




GAO Report to the Ranking Minority Member, 
Committee on Ways and Means, House of 
Representatives 
 
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/HEHS-96-87, 
Backlog Reduction Efforts Underway: Significant Challenges 
Remain (1996), http:// www.gao.gov/archive/1996/he96087.pdf. 
The report assesses the growing difficulty SSA faces with respect 
to the growing backlog of cases awaiting a hearing decision. The 
report finds that the backlog results from “(1) multiple levels of 
claims development and decision-making, (2) fragmented program 
accountability, (3) decisional disparities between DDS and OHA 
adjudicators, and (4) SSA's failure to define and communicate its 
management authority over the ALJs.” 
 
GAO Report to the Chairman of the Social Security 
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and 
Means 
 
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/HEHS 96-170, 
SSA Disabililty Redesign: More Testing Needed to Assess 
Feasibility of New Claim Manager Position (1996), 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/he96170.pdf. 
The report evaluates the concerns that come along with the 
creation of a new position, the disability claim manager. The report 
finds that SSA would benefit by increasing efficiency, better 
addressing claimant needs, and reducing processing time.  However, 
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the report concedes that no test conducted to assess the feasibility of 
the new position can be truly accurate at this time. 
 
Testimony Before the Social Security Subcommittee 
of the House Committee on Ways and Means 
 
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/T-HEHS-96-
211, SSA Disability Reengineering: Project Magnitude and 
Complexity Impede Implementation (1996), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-T-HEHS-96-
211/pdf/GAOREPORTS-T-HEHS-96-211.pdf. 
The report provides information on SSA's proposal to redesign its 
disability claims process.  Specifically, it assesses SSA's vision and 
progress for the redesign, the issues related to the scope and 
complexity of the redesign, and SSA's efforts to maintain stakeholder 
support.  The report finds that while the redesign can reduce costs, 
save time, and improve the quality of service, the scope of the 
redesign's initiatives may jeopardize the likelihood of accomplishing 
the goals of the redesign. 
 
GAO Report to the Chairman of the Social Security 
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and 
Means 
 
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/HEHS-97-20, 
SSA Disability Redesign, Focus Needed on Initiatives Most Crucial 
to Reducing Costs and Time (1996), 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/he97020.pdf. 
This report studies the impact of reengineering, which is a 
process used by various organizations “as a means to identify and 




Testimony Before the Social Security Subcommittee 
of the House Committee on Ways and Means 
 
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/T-HEHS-97-
118, Social Security Disability: SSA Actions to Reduce Backlogs and 
Achieve More Consistent Decisions Deserving High Priority (1997), 
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http:// www.gao.gov/archive/1997/he97118t.pdf. 
Jane L. Ross, the Director of Income Security Issues at the 
Health, Education, and Human Services Division, testifies on the 
actions SSA undertook as they relate to SSA's management of its 
Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income 
programs.  Ross testifies that the actions resulted in the development 




Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Human 
Resources and the Subcommittee on Social Security, 
Committee on Ways and Means, House of 
Representatives 
 
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/OCG-99-20, 
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Social Security 
Administration (1999). 
This report discusses the corrective actions SSA has undertaken 
to address major performance and management challenges, which 
have hampered the effectiveness of SSA.  While SSA has recently 
developed goals for improving its management, this report 
emphasizes that the “agency must take actions to address the root 
causes of its management and performance weaknesses and ensure 
sustained management oversight and attention.” 
 
GAO Report to the Chairman of the Social Security 
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and 
Means 
 
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/HEHS-99-25, 
SSA Disability Redesign: Actions Needed to Enhance Future 
Progress (1999), http:// www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99025.pdf. 
The report assesses SSA's efforts to redesign the disability claims 
process and identify actions that SSA can take to better ensure future 
progress.  The report finds that while SSA has made progress overall, 
it has yet to meet most of its milestones for testing and implementing 
its initiatives. 
 
GAO Report to the Chairman of the Social Security 
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Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and 
Means 
 
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/HEHS-99-50R, 
Social Security: Review of Disability Representatives (1999), http:// 
archive.gao.gov/paprpdf2/161794.pdf. 
This report assesses “(1) the extent to which disability 
representatives contribute to decisional delays, (2) other potential 
reasons for decisional delays, and (3) additional options available to 





GAO Report to the Chairman of the Social Security 
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and 
Means 
 
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-01-261, Major 
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